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THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE INEVITABILITY
OF PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL REVIEW
Robert J Pushaw,Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

What is the judiciary's proper role in reviewing claims that the
federal government, in attempting to protect national security, has
violated individual rights? This perennial constitutional question has
arisen with renewed urgency since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
A week after that tragedy, Congress authorized the President to
use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those who planned,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks and to prevent similar future
assaults. 1 George Bush invoked this statute, as well as his broad Article
II power as Commander in Chief, to wage war against al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and to (1) indefinitely jail anyone whom he alone
deemed an "enemy combatant" (i.e., part of forces engaged in armed
conflict with the United States), and (2) try such prisoners by military
2
commissions of his creation.
The Supreme Court has invalidated both of these policies. In
three cases handed down in 2004, a majority of Justices held that
alleged "enemy combatants" (both citizens and aliens) could invoke
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to vindicate their due process right
to an impartial hearing concerning the lawfulness of their deten© 2007 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D.,
Yale, 1988. Thanks to Tracey George, Barry McDonald, Grant Nelson, and Jim
Pfander for their very helpful comments.
1 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. II 2003)).
2 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in
10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
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torical movement in which the modern Court has become increasingly willing to rein in the government's assertion of war powers,",
Ideally, they would favor the execise of ordinary "judicial review"i.e., independently interpreting and applying the Constitution,
regardless of the competing views of Congress or the President."
President. Crucial because the Court's decision ... marked... a dramatic
refutation of the administration's entire approach to the "war on terror."..
iTihe Hamdancase stands for the proposition that the rule of law .. is not
subservient to the will of the executive, even during wartime.
David Cole, One Nation Under Law-Not Bush, SALON.COM, July 25, 2006,
http://rww.salon.com/apinion/feature/2006/O7/25/hamdan/index.htmL Similarly, Harold Koh deemed Hamdan "a stunning rebuke to the extreme theory of executive
power that has been put forward for the last five years." See Charlie Savage, Justices
Deal Bush Setback on Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2006, at Al (citing Koh); see
also Martin S. Flaherty, More Real Than Apparent: Separationof Powers, the Rule of Law,
and ComparativeExecutive "Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO Sup. CT. REv.

51, 51 ("Rarely has the Supreme Court handed a 'wartime' president a greater defeat,
or human rights defenders a greater victory."); id. at 82 (describing Hamdan as "an
act of courage"). Hamdan's lead attorney, Georgetown Law Professor Neal Katyal,
applauded this "rare Supreme Court rebuke to the President during armed conflict,"
Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rurnsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REv. 65, 66 (2006); see also id. at 69-70, 92, 97-116 (contending that
the Court correctly rejected the Bush Administration's "radical" and "dangerous" theory that the judiciary should show extreme deference to the President's assertion of
"inherent authority" to ignore or creatively interpret statutes and treaties governing
military afflairs).
The Hamdi trio of cases has elicited similar praise, See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Watching
the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment's Shadow, LAw & CoNTruMP.

PROBS.,

Spring 2005, at 255, 264 (noting that many " [ c livil libertarians and progressives...
applauded" these decisions); Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 555, 564-72 (2005) (citing Hamdi and Rasul as illustrating that the Court sometimes acts courageously in limiting military programs to
defend constitutional values); Jordan J. Paust, International Law Before the Supreme
Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. Rxv. 829, 830-41 (2005).
10 See Cole, Morality, supra note 8, at 1761-63 (making this claim, but acknowledging cases in which the Court failed to check government abuses in wartime); see
also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 221 (First Vintage Books ed.,
Vintage Books 2000) (1998) (discerning a positive overall trend toward protecting
individual rights despite certain decisions to the contrary); Goldsmith & Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 262, 285 (maintaining that Americans' regret over unnecessary or
excessive curtailment of individual rights in prior wars "produces a ratchet effect, over
time, in favor of more expansive civil liberties during wartime"); Harold Hongju Koh,
The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 39 (2002) (urging Americans to obey, not
ignore, the elaborate laws that have been developed over the years to deal with security crises such as the al Qaeda attacks).
11 These critics argue that the Constitution originally contemplated that federal
judges would ensure that a President's military action had been taken pursuant to
Congress's declaration of war (or equivalent authorization) and had not violated indi-
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By contrast, a few legal academics, most notably John Yoo, have
maintained that the Constitution (1) entrusts all military powers to
the political branches; (2) establishes a unitary executive uniquely
capable of taking swift action based on the expert advice of officials
who possess confidential information; and (3) sharply limits judicial
review of wartime decisions.12 These scholars have defended the Bush
vidual legal rights. They lament that both the Court and Congress have often shirked
their constitutional duties to check the executive, resulting in a systematic and permanent reduction in civil liberties. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY
5-11 (1993); Louis FISHER, CONGRESSiONAtL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 3-14
(2000); Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6-16 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER]; THOMAS M. FR'CK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JuoICiAL ANswEms 3-9 (1992); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 80-95
(1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECuRiTY CONSTITUTION 74-77, 158-61
(1990); Lobel, supra note 8, at 767-90; Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,81 YALE L.J. 672, 677-88 (1972); Peter J. Spiro,
Globalizationand the (ForeignAffairs) Constitution,63 OHIo ST. L.J. 649, 675-86 (2002);
William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding,and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 695, 700, 740-56 (1997).
Two scholars have urged federal courts to apply ordinary administrative law standards, which feature deferential yet meaningful judicial review of the decisions of
expert agencies. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative
Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005); Christina E. Wells, Questioning
Deference, 69 Mo. L. REv. 903 (2004). Under this approach,judges would take a "hard
look" at the President's factual and legal determinations to ensure that he has provided a rational justification, based on substantial evidence, for a particular military
action. See Masur, supra, at 443-56, 482-501, 519-21; Wells, supra, at 944-48.
Such proposals raise several problems. First, standards of judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706 (2000)), for executive actions taken pursuant to garden-variety regulatory
statutes are not obviously relevant to presidential decisions about war made under a
Constitution that predates the administrative state by a century-and-a-half. Second,
agencies act on a publicly available record, whereas the President and his subordinates make military decisions based upon information that is often confidential;
therefore, a court order compelling disclosure of these facts raises serious separationof-powers concerns. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638, 705-06 (1974). Finally,
it seems unrealistic to expectjudges to hold that the President's proffered reasons for
a military decision were irrational and unsupported-or for the President to obey
such a judgment when he has concluded that America's security is at risk. See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells, 69 Mo. L.
REv. 959, 968-70 (2004).

12 SeeJohn C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Continuation];
John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, War]; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The President'sAuthority Over Foreign Affairs:
An Executive Branch Perspective,67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 527 (1999) (contending that the
Constitution grants the executive primary, but not exclusive or unlimited, power to
conduct foreign policy and preserve national security).
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Administration's War on Terrorism' 3 and condemned the "enemy
combatant" cases as unprecedented intrusions into the executive's
4
domain.1
Each side in this debate makes a valuable contribution, but
neither fully captures the complexity of judicial review in this area.
The Bush critics correctly stress that only autonomous Article III
judges can ensure that Congress and the President stay within legal
bounds and can protect individual rights in times of crisis, and they
cite several cases in which the Court has done so.1 5 These scholars
cannot, however, persuasively tell us why military decisions have always
been accorded a far more deferential standard of judicial review than
purely domestic ones, with the result that the government's policies
usually pass muster--even seemingly blatant constitutional violations
such as Franklin Roosevelt's mass imprisonment of Japanese-Americans during World War 11.16 Moreover, some civil libertarians have
engaged in wishful thinking by suggesting that the modern Court has
Similarly, Professors Posner and Vermeule have commended federal judges for
showing extra deference during times of crisis. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Verrneule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. Rev. 605 (2003). In their view, the
Court has rationally concluded that the benefits of passivity-enabling the politically
accountable executive to act quickly and decisively based upon superior military
expertise and access to information-outweigh the costs of potential government
abuse or curtailment of civil liberties. See id. at 606-11, 639-44; see also Earl M. Maltz,
The Exigencies of War, 36 RUTGxRS LJ. 861, 869-70 (2005) (claiming that courts must
be extremely deferential to government actions taken during a total war or insurrection, because judicial intervention to uphold individual rights poses intractable practical problems and might result in a disaster).
13 They assert that terrorists are not ordinary criminals entitled to regular judicial
processes but rather nonuniformed enemy warriors to be dealt with by the President
according to the law of war, which allows both detention for the duration of the
armed conflict and trials by military tribunals. See Derek Jinks, September 11 and the
Laws of War, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 10-20 (2003);John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The
Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 215-28 (2003).

14

See John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006

CATO

Sup. CT. REv. 83 (maintaining that the Court in Hamdan, as in Hamdi and Rasul,

ignored centuries of constitutional practice and precedent by interfering with the
President's Article II power to make military policyjudgments and forced the political
branches to expend resources that would be better spent fighting terrorists).
15 See, e.g., Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at 2566-67, 2572-73.
16 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the executive branch's judgment that the war againstJapan required the forcible relocation of
Japanese-Americans to prevent espionage and sabotage, despite infringements on
their due process and equal protection rights). Libertarians might respond that such
cases were wrongly decided by weak Courts, but this argument does not explain the
frequency of such "bad" decisions throughout history and their support by Justices of
varying political and ideological stripes.
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been progressing in the direction of ever-expanding protection of
17
individual rights against assertions of war powers.
At the other end of the spectrum, President Bush's defenders
accurately highlight the dominant constitutional role of the political
branches (especially the executive) in military affairs and the correspondingly restricted nature of judicial review."' Nonetheless, they
have trouble accounting for several cases in which the Court has
struck down war measures. 1 9
17 An exhaustive recent study of cases over the past sixty years demonstrates that
the Court consistently sacrifices constitutional rights and liberties during emergencies. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court DuringCrisis:How War Affects Only Non-War
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2005). This phenomenon dates back to the earliest days of
the Republic. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
(2004) (urging that, to avoid repeating mistakes such as the Alien and Sedition Acts
of 1798 and the targeting of Communists in the 1950s, America must develop a culture of civil liberties-implemented through government mechanisms and legal doctrines-to deal with the inevitable stresses of wartime, especially the tendency to
suppress dissent). For similar themes, see, for example,

MARTIN

S. SHEFFER, THEJUDI-

CIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (1999); MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM

UNDER FIRE (1990).
Professors Posner and Vermeule have dismissed, as empirically unsustainable, the

notion of a "libertarian ratchet" (i.e., that wars have ended up producing ever-greater
respect for civil liberties). See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 622-25. They
also reject the opposite claim that increased executive powers granted during an
emergency always become permanent, thereby irreversibly diminishing individual

rights. Id. at 609-21. Rather, they conclude that there are no uni-directional trends:
The government balances security and liberty interests in a complex policy calculus
depending on the circumstances. Id. at 625-26.
18 See infra Part I (summarizing the constitutional framework).
19 Professor Yoo has argued that federal courts have appropriately adopted a
unique approach to cases involving military affairs. John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and
the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427 (2003). On the one hand, the initiation of war abroad has been deemed a political question because the Constitution
vests military powers exclusively in the political branches and does not specify a single
required process for commencing war. Id. at 428-31, 433-36, 451. On the other
hand, federal judges have examined the domestic ramifications of war-especially
cases concerning American citizens as enemies or operations within the United
States-but under a deferential standard that preserves options to the elected
branches. Id. at 428-29, 440, 450-51.
Professor Yoo helpfully categorizes most Supreme Court decisions. For example,
he is correct thatjudicial review has never been exercised over disputes arising out of
the initiation of hostilities. See infra notes 58-63, 69-77, 83, 185-88 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, his suggestion that the Court adjudicates issues dealing with
the domestic implications of war does not explain several critical decisions. For
instance, the Court sometimes has refused to review executive judgments concerning
military operations within the United States involving American citizens, most notably
Lincoln's blockade of Confederate ports and his use of military commissions. See infra
notes 86, 90, 100-06, 110-14 and accompanying text. Conversely, in certain situa-
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Professors Issacharoff, Pildes, and Sunstein are correct that the
Court has focused on whether Congress authorized or approved the
executive conduct being challenged. Unfortunately, this judicial
determination is usually subjective because the relevant legislation
does not unambiguously endorse or forbid particular acts, but rather
broadly empowers the President to take steps that he deems appropriate to protect national security. 23 In actual cases, such vague statutes
are interpreted as providing authorization when the Justices want to
avoid confronting the President 24 and as withholding authorization
when they wish to rebuke him.25 Therefore, analysis should center
political safeguards do not work when government restrictions on liberty target a
select group. Id. at 52-53, 65-75, 109.
23 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 388-89, 402-05
(2004) (stressing that congressional intent is often unclear and thatjudges have struggled to determine implied legislative authorization). Most pertinently, Congress's
directive to the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those
connected with the September 11 attacks was comparable to the broad legislative
delegations made in all declared wars and in other major conflicts like Vietnam, and
therefore the validity of Bush's actions should be evaluated in light of executive practices under such legislation. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the Wair on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2052, 2076, 2078-83
(2005) (citing relevant laws). By contrast, in more limited military engagements, such
as those against revolutionary France in the late 1790s and Somalia in 1993, Congress
has carefully restricted the President's resources, methods, targets, purposes, and
timetable. Id. at 2072-74. The meaning of such precisely drawn statutes rarely generates litigated disputes.
24 For example, in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the Court construed a vague
statute as empowering President Roosevelt to convene a military commission to try
Nazi saboteurs. Id. at 38-39. The Court thereby sidestepped a showdown with FDR,
who had indicated his intent to execute these men regardless of the outcome of the
case. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (interpreting a federal
law that had reenacted verbatim the statute found in Quirin to have authorized military commissions as no longer providing such power, and construing other legislation
that broadly authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to
fight al Qaeda as not permitting him to establish a military tribunal to try a trusted
aide of Osama bin Laden); see also infra notes 316-38 and accompanying text (arguing that the implausibility of the Court's statutory interpretation suggested that its
true motive was to chastise President Bush).
The scholars who advocate a moderate approach candidly acknowledge that
judges have great latitude in interpreting generally worded statutes to ascertain
whether or not they endorse executive military action. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 20, at 37-38; Sunstein, supra note 22, at 97-99. Their efforts to resolve this
problem are unsatisfying. For instance, Professors Issacharoff and Pildes claim that
congressional approval is a "healthy fiction" because it always preserves the option for
Congress to intervene if it disagrees with the President (or with the Court's determination that a statute did or did not authorize his conduct). Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
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not on an illusory search for congressional intent, but rather on identifying the extra-statutory factors that influenced the Court to exercise
its discretion to reach particular results.
In my view, the quest for a coherent jurisprudential framework is
futile because the Constitution's text and history do not clearly reveal
any single proper way to reconcile judicial review with war powers.
This uncertainty has led the Court to eschew black-letter rules in favor
of a flexible approach that reflects political and practical considerations. Perhaps the only bedrock principle is that the Court will almost
never hear general claims that a military decision exceeded Congress's powers under Article I or the President's authority under Article I-for example, that the President has unconstitutionally
initiated hostilities because Congress did not formally declare war. 26
When a party challenges the exercise of war powers as violating his or
her individuallegal rights, however, the Court usually has exercised judi27
cial review, albeit with great deference to the political branches.
Nonetheless, the degree of deference has varied with the facts and
note 20, at 38-40. The fiction becomes unhealthy, however, if the Court creatively
interprets a statute as denying the President a particular power to act, and that impotence causes Americans to be harmed or killed. Professor Sunstein asserts that the
Court's demand for statutory specificity and clarity increases as the magnitude of the
intrusion on individual liberty grows. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 97-99. That proposition is debatable. For example., the prisoners in Quirin had not merely their liberty but their lives at stake, yet the Court upheld their death sentences imposed by a
military commission that had not been clearly or particularly authorized by the statute
at issue. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 44-63, 68-77, 83, 100-06, 110-13, 123-27, 130-34, 153-63 and
accompanying text. But see Geoffrey S. Corn, PresidentialWar Power: Do the Courts Offer
Any Answers, 157 MI. L. Riv. 180 (1998) (maintaining that judges can review
whether the President may lawfully send armed forces into combat, albeit with a
strong presumption of validity when Congress has expressly or implicitly supported
the action).
27 See infra notes 64, 78-81, 84, 117-22, 135-53, 163-75, 186 and accompanying
text. On the surface, the modern Court usually applies a familiar test to alleged constitutional violations: The government cannot infringe due process, equal protection,
free speech, or other fundamental rights unless it employs the "least restrictive
means" to achieve a "compelling government interest." See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (creating this analysis). Strict application of this test,
however, would invariably result in the government's victory because national security
is the paradigmatic compelling interest, and judges typically cannot determine
whether the means chosen by the President (who has access to classified information
and expert military advisers) were the narrowest way to meet the threat. Moreover, in
many cases the legal fights at issue derive not from the Constitution but from federal
statutes, treaties, international law, or common law. Whatever the source of the individual right, however, the Court has shown respect for the judgments of the coordinate branches.
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NO,

have prudentially balanced
circumstances of each case, as the Justices
several malleable factors.
typically has yielded to the
One has been mentioned: The Court
for his action, either because ConPresident if he had legal authority
it was taken) or Article I1granted
gress approved of it (before or after
Except in rare cases, however,
him independent power to proceed.
28
Hence, judicial discussions of statusuch authorization is unclear.
tend to mask three impressionistic
tory and constitutional meaning
judgment calls.
and immediacy of the miliFirst, the Court evaluates the gravity
for the President's responsive meatary crisis, as well as the necessity
has granted the President far more
sure. Not surprisingly, the Court
emergencies like the Civil
latitude in addressing nation-threatening
conflicts. Of course, distinguishing
War and World War 11 than lesser
for judges, who lack the Presimajor from minor crises is very difficult
policy intelligence. The Court
dent's access to military and foreign
of second-guessing the President's
often has glossed over the problem
such as the Korean War or the
assessment that a particular conflict,
and thus requires a specific and
War on Terrorism, is urgently serious
steel mills to ensure weapons prostrong response (e.g., taking over
to try enemy combatants).29
duction or using military tribunals
egregiousness and magnitude
Second, the Justices consider the
judges find unnecessary or arbiof the legal violation. For example,
more troublesome than temporary
trary deprivations of bodily liberty
3 0 Again, this factor has
our troops.
suppression of speech to protect
often reveals that the heat of the
built-in subjectivity, and hindsight
illustrate, few executive decisions
moment clouded judgment. To
of
President Roosevelt's relocation
seem as monstrously unlawful as
this action."' By contrast,
Japanese-Americans, yet the Court sustained
by military comHamdan
Yasir
trying Osama bin Laden's henchman
"Commander in Chief," without further
28 Article 11 simply dubs the President
unilateral
plausible to argue that the President's
elaboration. This silence makes it
authorizamilitary
most
intermediate. Likewise,
power should be broad, narrow, or
and
and precision. See supra notes 23-25
lucidity
with
speak
not
tion statutes do
accompanying text.
343 U.S. 579, 584-89 (1952); Hamdan,
29 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
126 S.Ct. at 2772-98.
(declaring
507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion)
30 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
detention
physical
from
free
being
[is]
interests...
that "the most elemental of liberty
by one's own government").
31 Koremasu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
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as a huge legal problem, but
mission would not strike most Americans3 2
otherwise.
a majority of Justices thought
that its orders will be
Third, the Court calculates the likelihood
upon the President's political
obeyed, which depends primarily
the crisis is ongoing or has
strength and secondarily upon whether
never articulated but often seems
passed. ss This last criterion is
pivotal.
loom large. For instance, AbraIn practice, the foregoing factors
ignore any judicial decree that
ham Lincoln made it plain he would
that the Constitution implicitly
34
clashed with his understanding
to save the Union.
necessary
anything
do
to
allowed the President
blockade of Confederate ports and
The Court upheld his unilateral
-actions Congress later specifiseizure of all merchant vessels there property without due process.3 5
taking of
cally approved-despite the
War had ended and the politically
By contrast, a year after the Civil
President, the Court granted a
inept Andrew Johnson had become
citizen who had been sentenced
writ of habeas corpus to an American
who successfully argued that the
to death by a military tribunal and
right to an ordinary jury
Constitution gave him the fundamental
this pattern recurred. The Court
trial.3 6 In the twentieth century,
enjoyed immense popudared not confront Franklin Roosevelt-who
he took constitutionally dubilar and congressional support-when
of World War I1,but struck down
ous steps to resolve the epic crisis
successor Harry Truman dursimilar actions by his3 7politically weaker
ing the Korean War.
t]
sup8, at 271 (noting that " I he public
note
supra
Sunstein,
&
Goldsmith
see
32 See
But
margin").
2-1
than
proposal by a greater
ported the Bush Military Commission
and
political,
legal,
the
of
the different attitude
id. at 262, 271-74, 281 (describing
actions
and Watergate distrust of executive
post-Vietnam
the
reflect
media elite, who
rights).
strong commitment to individual
that threaten civil liberties and a
177 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 115-27, 138, 149-53,
34 See infra Part II.B.1.
notes 100-09
Black) 635 (1863), discussed infra
35 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
and accompanying text.
infra notes
(4 Wall.) 2, 118-27 (1866), examined
36 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
117-22 and accompanying text.
the major
and accompanying text (analyzing
37 See infra notes 131-53, 163-78
REVIEW AND THE
JUDICIAL
WAR:
OF
IN THE NAME
cases); see also CHRISTOPHER N. MAY,
courts often have
(1989) (contending that federal
256-75
at
1918,
SINCE
WAR POWERS
ended, thereby
have
after wartime emergencies
appropriately delayed decisions until
likelihood that
the
increasing
of the legal issues,
facilitating a more sober evaluation
and
without threatening the military effort,
relevant information can be disclosed
backing).
by a President who has popular
reducing the danger of defiance

1o16

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82--3

In short, the rigor of judicial review waxes and wanes depending
upon the context of each case. Against this historical backdrop, it
would be premature to conclude that the four recent "enemy combatant" decisions portend a permanent shift to heroic judicial defense of
individual rights against government overreaching in waging war.
Rather, it is more likely that these cases eventually will be grouped
with others in which the Court seized opportunities to vindicate legal
rights against politically vulnerable Presidents in perceived nonemergency situations. Commentators who have lionized the Justices for
their "courage" in thwarting George Bush fail to grasp that "kicking
'em when they're down" exhibits no bravery and that this Court (like
its predecessors) would be unlikely to stand up to a popular President
in the midst of a major war.
The aforementioned ideas will be developed in four parts. Part I
examines the original meaning of the constitutional provisions on war
powers. Part II explains the Court's ad hoc balancing of multiple
legal and political factors, which usually--but not always-results in
upholding the government's actions. Part III places the recent cases
involving "enemy combatants" within that tradition. Part IV argues
that the Court has -properly declined to exercise ordinary judicial
review in the national security context. Rather, the Justices have recognized that separation of powers counsels extraordinary deference
because military decisions are (1) peculiarly within the institutional
competence of Congress and the President, and (2) matters of paramount national importance for which elected officials will be held
accountable. Accordingly, it is inevitable that the Court will be influenced not merely by abstract legal principles but also by pragmatic
political considerations. Nonetheless, such political realities need not
induce the Court to uphold on the merits presidential measures that are
plainly unconstitutional, such as Roosevelt's incarceration of Japanese-Americans. When a politically powerful President has made an
irreversible decision in seeming violation of a particular constitutional
provision because he believes doing so is essential to the war effort,
and when he will likely defy any judicial order to desist, the Court
should not affirmatively legitimate such conduct. Rather, it should
either decline to review the case altogether or employ a jurisdictional
avoidance mechanism such as the political question doctrine, thereby
shifting responsibility solely to elected officials. With this one exception, I would leave the Court's jurisprudence largely intact.
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THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Constitution on its face neither authorizes nor prohibits federal judges from deciding legal challenges to the exercise of war powers. Nonetheless, the most logical inference from the available
textual, structural, and historical evidence is that such judicial review
3
would be extremely limited.

38 In previous work, I have used a Neo-Federalist methodology, which recovers
the original meaning, intent, and understanding of the Constitution's text, structure,
and political theory in order to illuminate modern constitutional issues. See, e.g.,
RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 393, 397-99, 454, 470-72 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability];
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 695, 697-99 (2002). This analytical framework
cannot easily be applied to military affairs, however.
As originally designed, the Constitution (1) granted all powers to initiate and
prosecute war to Congress and the President, and (2) authorized the judiciary, in
litigated cases, to examine executive actions to ensure that they complied with federal
statutes and other government acts to determine whether they comported with the
Constitution. Unfortunately, neither the Constitution's text nor its drafting and ratification history contain any direct evidence on the specific question of whether, and to
what extent, courts can review the political branches' exercise of war powers. To solve
this problem, I try to draw the most plausible inferences from the Constitutionattempting to give effect to all of its provisions-and from its underlying structure
and political philosophy, as confirmed by early practice and precedent, See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution,86 IOWA
L. REv. 735, 738-44, 822-43 (2001) [hereinafter Pushaw, Inherent] (using this
approach to ascertain the contours of inherent federal judicial authority). This
inquiry reveals that the Constitution almost surely did not contemplate judicial review
of issues concerning the commencement or conduct of war, but likely permitted
review of claims that the exercise of military powers violated individual legal rightsalbeit with greater deference to the political branches than would be shown in purely
domestic affairs.
Subsequent history has demonstrated, however, that the Court has been unable
to define the precise scope of appropriate deference in a legally principled way.
Instead, it has decided cases based upon their particular facts and circumstances in
light of political and practical considerations. My main goal is to provide an honest
description and analysis of this precedent. In attempting to identify the nonlegal
factors that have influenced the Justices, I owe an intellectual debt to legal realists, to
scholars who have applied decisionmaking psychology to adjudication, and to political scientists who have shown that judges seek to rationally maximize their policy preferences and engage in strategic behavior with other government officials. For a
discussion of such work, see Tracey E. George & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., How Is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1265, 1273-76 (2002) (reviewing MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, CONSTiTUTIONAL PROCESS (2000)); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have
the Constitutional Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LECis. 319,
338-40 (2005) [hereinafter Pushaw, Congress].
In short, although a Neo-Federalist perspective yields some valuable insights
about judicial review of war powers, it does not supply workable legal rules that courts
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Although the Constitution does not contain a specific clause providing that courts can determine whether political officials have complied with the document's requirements, such power flows from the
Constitution's structure and political theory. 3 3 As Alexander Hamilton explained in The FederalistNo. 78, only federal judges, who had
been appointed through a selective process and guaranteed independence, could be fully trusted to exercise the 'judicial power" of deciding cases according to the law-including the supreme and
fundamental law of the sovereign People, the Constitution. 40 Moreover, he stressed that the judiciary alone could impartially ascertain
whether the elected branches had obeyed the written limits on their
own power and had not violated individual legal rights. 4

In short,

Hamilton asserted that the Constitution created a "natural presumption" favoring judicial review. 4 2 Nonetheless, he recognized that this
presumption could be rebutted by "particular provisions in the
[C] onstitution" that gave Congress or the President ultimate decision43
making authority.
Although The FederalistNo. 78 did not list examples of such political questions, Hamilton's related essays (and the writings of other
leading Federalists) indicate that the actual process of making war
and peace could not be examinedjudicially. Military powers, which in
England had been committed entirely to the royal executive (except
can apply impartially and consistently. Indeed, the failure of conventional legal analysis in this area seems to be intractable and universal, as reflected in Cicero's maxim
that "during war law is silent." See Epstein et al., supra note 17, at 3.
Outside of the unique context of military affairs, however, I cling to the belief
that federal courts can, and should, formulate and apply rules of law rooted in the
Constitution's text, structure, history, and early precedent. See Pushaw, Congress,
supra, 338-53.
39 For a detailed explanation of this point, see Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 38,
at 407-35.
40 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). For similar claims, see 2 THE DEBATES [N THE SEVERAL STATE CONvE.rrONs
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445-46, 478-81, 489 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES] (James Wilson); 2 MAX FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVErNON

73-78 (rev. ed. 1937) (James Madison).

41 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 524-27; see
also RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Article II's Case/ControversyDistinction and the Dual Functions
of FederalCourts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 492, 496-502 (1994) (documenting that
most other Founders shared Hamilton's understanding that independent courts
would exercise judicial review).
42 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 524-25.
43 Id.; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question
Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1165,
1196-200 (2002) (recommending that the Court resurrect Hamilton's approach).
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and suspend the writ of habeas corpus when an invasion or rebellion
imperils the public safety.5 2 Article II makes the President the repository of "executive power"5 3 and the "Commander in Chief."5 4 The
Framers thereby established a unitary executive with the singular institutional capacity for taking quick, energetic, decisive action based on
the informed advice of subordinate officials.55 These qualities were
especially important in military affairs5 6 :
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the
direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and
employing the common strength, forms [a] usual and essential part
57
in the definition of the executive authority.

The Constitution did not describe the existence (much less the
parameters) of the President's power to proceed absent a formal dec-

52 "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Although this clause does not explicitly state that "Congress" alone
can suspend habeas, this interpretation seems unavoidable given the placement of
this provision in Article I (which pertains exclusively to Congress) and longstanding
English practice. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 91-92, 101 (1807).
53 U.S. CONST. art. i1, § 1, cf. 1. The President also has a correlative duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. art. 1I, § 3. Scholars have suggested
that this clause repudiated the Lockean notion of an executive prerogative to act
without (or even contrary to) legislation. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT
7-8, 286-87 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984).
54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Clause 2 authorizes the President to "make treaties," which become effective upon ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. In this
Article, I do not analyze such nonmilitary foreign affairs powers, except to note their
obvious connection to the protection of national security. See Powell, supra note 12,
at 564-66.
55 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 471-73
(contrasting the "[dlecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" of the single executive
magistrate with the deliberateness, conciliation, and public nature of the multi-member legislature); see also DEATES, supra note 40, at 447 (James Wilson) (same); THE
FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note 40, at 434-36 (stressing that the President
could negotiate treaties because of his ability to act quickly based upon information
that was often confidential).
56 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 471
("Energy in the Executive... is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks .... "); id. at 476 (same).
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 500; see Powell, supra note 12, at 568-74 (explaining that the President, as Commander in Chief,
has power to deploy troops and to conduct and control military operations).
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laration of war or similar authorization, s and scholars have heatedly
debated this issue. 59 As a practical matter, however, Presidents have
long asserted power to take military action unilaterally, and indeed
have become dominant in this area.60 Nonetheless, Congress can

58 Even supporters of robust congressional war power concede that the President
has independent authority to respond to sudden attacks. See, e.g., John Hart Ely,
Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1388
(1988). For instance, Professor Monaghan rejects assertions of broad inherent presidential power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, but acknowledges a
narrow residual authority to act immediately in a genuine national emergency and
only later seek congressional approval. Henry P. Monaghan, The ProtectivePower of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.REv. 1, 9-11, 24-38 (1993); see also id. at 11, 61-74 (recognizing a similarly limited executive power to protect United States personnel, property,
and instrumentalities).
59 The prevailing view is that the Constitution granted Congress exclusive power
.to declare war" or otherwise authorize the use of military force, but that Congress has
failed to guard this prerogative from presidential encroachment. See, e.g., ELY, supra
note 11, at 3-10; FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 11, at 14-15; see also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 239-41

(2002) (maintaining that Congress alone has power to initiate war, and that only the
President can conduct that war); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69
U. CHI. L. REv. 1543, 1609-35 (2002) (arguing that Congress can "declare war" by
either formal proclamation or military assault and that the President cannot initiate
"war" without legislative approval, but that the President unilaterally can defend the
nation against attack and use military threats and force that fall short of creating a
state of "war").
By contrast, Professor Yoo has claimed that the Constitution does not establish
any particular process for initiating war (as it does for enacting statutes and ratifying
treaties), but rather confers on Congress and the President all military powers and
allows them to work out the details. SeeYoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 173-74,
241, 252-64, 288-90, 295-96, 300, 305; Yoo, War, supra note 12, at 1662-84. Therefore, the President can begin and manage the war as part of his authority as Commander in Chief and his executive power, subject to congressional control through
appropriations and impeachment. See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 174,
196-97, 218, 241-90, 295-96, 300, 305; Yoo, War, supra note 12, at 1658-59, 1665,
1674, 1680-83. Professor Yoo asserts that the Declare War Clause merely gave to Congress the 'Juridical" power of determining whether we were at war with another
nation, thereby triggering the international laws of war and domestic constitutional
military authority. See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 204-06, 242-50, 288, 295;
Yoo, War, supra note 12, at 1667-73, 1679.
60 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 68; supra note 1I (citing numerous academics
who have also recognized, and criticized, this development). Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith maintain that neither the Framers nor any Presidents have believed that
using military force required a prior congressional declaration of war, as evidenced by
America's involvement in hundreds of undeclared wars dating back to the beginning
of the Republic. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 2057-62.
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ducting military operations, funding them, and negotiating with the
enemy.

63

Unfortunately, the Framers and Ratifiers never mentioned what
would happen if someone challenged the exercise of war powers not
as inconsistent with Articles I or II, but rather as violating his or her
individual legal rights. Perhaps they thought that military affairs
inherently involved political questions in all circumstances. Conversely, it is possible that they contemplated regular judicial review
whenever individual rights were at stake. The most reasonable conclusion, however, is that the Founders would have sought to give effect
both to the Constitution's provisions designed to protect national
defense and to its institution of judicial review. The Supreme Court
has achieved this goal by adopting the compromise approach of taking jurisdiction but showing healthy deference to the political
64
branches.
63 See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 176-82, 269-70, 284, 287-90, 295-96,
300 (demonstrating that the extensive Convention and Ratification debates contain
no suggestion that federal courts could or would review the exercise of war powers by
Congress or the President, who were given complete authority in this area and were
expected to check each other); see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 38, at 507-08
(contending that the Constitution's scheme of shared legislative-executive power over
warmaking impliedly excluded the judiciary).
Thus, I agree with the Court's consistent refusal to decide political questions
involving whether the President can use military force in the absence of a declaration
of war or other congressional authorization. See infra Part I. Conversely, I reject
Dean Koh's argument that federal courts should vigorously review executive branch
assertions of warmaking power in order to restore the proper constitutional balance
in making decisions about national security. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in ForeignAffairs: Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255
(1988).
The judiciary's only explicit constitutional role in the military context was to con-

duct impartial treason trials involving persons accused of "levying war" against the
United States or "adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S.
CONST. art. 1II, § 3. For an illuminating recent analysis of this provision, see Carlton
F.W. Larson, The Forgotten ConstitutionalLaw of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863 (2006) (maintaining that this clause guarantees a criminal
trial in an ordinary federal court to persons subject to the law of treason-a category
that includes both American citizens and aliens present in the United States who are
not accompanying an invading military force). As originally understood, this Treason
Clause may have limited the ability of the political branches to deprive alleged traitors
of this judicial forum and instead remit them to military jurisdiction.
64 For a defense of the Court's position, see Yoo, supra note 19, at 428-31,
433-36, 440, 450-51; see also Sunstein, supra note 22, at 66 ("Structural concerns,
along with simple prudence, argue in favor of considerable judicial deference to presidential choices when national security is at risk."). Two other scholars have provided
especially insightful explanations of the Court's approach.
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JURISPRUDENCE ON WAR POWERS

A.

The Marshall Court

In Marbury v. Madison,65 Chief Justice Marshall simultaneously
announced the power ofjudicial review6 6 but recognized certain questions to be "political,"67 including the President's conduct of military

affairs and his foreign policy decisions that did not transgress individual rights. 68

The Marshall Court also deemed nonjusticiable several

First, Professor McGinnis has argued that, for constitutional and political
reasons, the President has the strongest interest in war powers, whereas the judiciary
places the least value on this subject because it lacks the institutional capacity to make
sound assessments and because an incorrect decision would have dramatic effects that
would harm its prestige. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers,
56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 305-08, 316-18. He finds it unsurprising that courts have tended to defer to the President's military decisions and leave
the primary checking role to Congress, thereby maximizing their power over the area
they care about most-protecting individual rights in domestic cases. See id. at
293-94, 306-08, 316-18.
Second, Professor Nzelibe applauds the federaljudiciary's abstention from deciding constitutional questions about the allocation of foreign-affairs powers on the
ground that courts have peculiar institutional disadvantages in this area compared to
the political branches, such as a lack of resources to track the evolution of international norms and an absence of authoritativeness and legitimacy in determining matters of foreign policy. SeeJide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IowA L.
REv. 941, 944-45, 975-99 (2004). He does recognize, however, that judicial review
may be justified when a decision about foreign affairs affects individual rights or
domestic property, although even then courts properly show substantial respect for
the judgments of the political departments. See id. at 999-1006.
For an opposing view, see Kalyani Robbins, Framers' Intent and Military Power: Has
Supreme Court Deference to the Military Gone Too Far, 78 OR. L. REv. 767, 776-81 (1999)
(contending that the Constitution's inclusion of specific provisions that recognize the
need for deference to the military in cases of urgent necessity, such as the Suspension
Clause, implies that courts should enforce all other constitutional rights that are not
so expressly limited).
65 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
66 Id. at 176-80.
67 Id. at 169-71.
68 Id. at 166-67. SeeYoo, supra note 19, at 432-33 (making this point to rebut the
argument that it is inconsistent to endorse judicial review yet deny its applicability to
cases involving war initiation). Indeed, a decade before Marbuy, the Justices declined
to render an advisory opinion on legal questions stemming from America's neutral
status in the war between England and France-a decision driven both by constitutional interpretation and by a desire to avoid direct judicial involvement in the struggle between Congress and the executive over control of foreign relations. See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "DearJohn" Letters: Advisory Opinions
in HistoricalPerspective,87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1997) (book review).
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congressional powers, such as declaring war 69 and determining the
rights of foreigners during wartime. 70 The Chief Justice repeatedly
stressed that such political decisions about military matters affected
the entire country, and that therefore any disputes could be resolved
only through the national political process (i.e., appealing to Congress or the President to change their policies and, if they failed to do
so, electing different officials).71
The Court's most detailed analysis came in Martin v. Mott,72 in

which it refused to reach the merits of the President's decision to call
forth the militia to defend against what he concluded was a credible
threat of invasion. 73 This holding reflected three concerns. First,
Congress had exercised its Article I powers by granting the President
sole discretion to determine whether an emergency justified enlisting
the help of the militia.7 4 Second, he had to base military decisions on
information that was often confidential and on evidence that might be
inadmissible in court. 75 Third, the President as Commander in Chief
could not be forced to disclose the facts supporting his decision to a
judge or jury for possible second-guessing. 76 Rather, his actions were
subject only to the political scrutiny of the electoral process and con77
gressional oversight.
Despite these "political question" rulings, however, the Marshall
Court remained open to hearing allegations that the President, in
exercising his war powers, had breached a legal duty in a way that
violated the claimant's rights. The earliest cases arose when Congress,
instead of declaring a "general" war against Revolutionary France and
thereby triggering the full range of executive authority, approved only
"partial" armed hostilities limited to certain objectives, places, and
times. 78 For instance, in Little v. Barreme,79 the Court concluded that
69 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824); Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 29 (1801).
70 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818).
71 See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197; Marbuwy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
164-71.
72 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
73 Id. at 28-33. In Martin, a citizen who had been fined for refusing to report for
military duty claimed that a genuine emergency did not exist that would have justified
recruiting the militia. Id. at 23-24, 29-33.
74 id. at 28-32.
75 Id. at 31.
76 Id. at 30-33.
77 Id. at 32.
78 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 45-46 (1800) (using this distinction to

find that a state of "war" existed between America and France, despite the absence of
a formal declaration). The definitive study is ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QuAst-WAR:
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per se are treated as political questions.8 3 When such decisions allegedly violate individual rights, however, courts have exercised judicial
power, albeit with keen sensitivity to the government's legitimate prerogatives.8 4 The amount of deference depends on the particular context of each case, although a few considerations have emerged as
consistently important. Examination of the main decisions helps to
isolate those factors.
B.

The Civil War Era

The Civil War and Reconstruction transformed the constitutional
landscape. Most pertinently for present purposes, Lincoln success-

83 The seminal case is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). There the
Taney Court declined to entertain a claim that Rhode Island's government, which
had been in existence since receiving a colonial charter in 1663, did not have a
.republican form" because it had not been established pursuant to a popular Convention that created a truly representative legislature, as had the upstart government that
brought the suit. Id. at 34-45. This holding rested on two considerations. First,
Congress had recognized the charter government as the legitimate one, and the President (with statutory authorization) had taken measures to call out the militia to suppress the rival government. Id. at 42-45. Second, overturning these decisions would
result in voiding all the acts of Rhode Island's charter government, which would create political and legal chaos. Id. at 38-39. In other cases, however, the Court decided
questions that seemed political. See, e.g.,
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603,
614-15 (1850) (ruling that the President, absent congressional approval, could not
annex conquered territory to the United States).
84 For a relatively rare example of a successful suit, see Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133-35 (1851) (invalidating an army officer's seizure of private
property during the Mexican War where no congressional authorization existed and
no emergencyjustification had been shown); see also CLIrON RoSSiTR,

THE SUPREME

17 (1976) (concluding that the Court usually
defers, but occasionally "afford[s] a grievously injured citizen relief from a palpably
unwarranted use of presidential or military power"); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial
Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REv. 227, 259-62, 269-74,
283-92, 304-05, 326-27 (1991) (documenting the Court's adjudication of numerous
cases touching on foreign policy when the plaintiff claimed a violation of individual
rights, but noting its application of lenient standards, such as accepting as the controlling law the legal interpretation previously made by political officials); cf Shira A.
Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a
Time of Crisis,32 HOFSTRA L. Rxv. 795, 796-97, 815, 852 (2004) (arguing that judicial
deference is appropriate only in the case of "a truly military decision" such as a battlefield directive, and not when a President such as George Bush makes an unsupported
assertion that a "war" power must be exercised in seeming violation of a constitutional
right).
COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
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fully asserted sweeping presidential authority that seemed to run afoul
of several constitutional provisions.

5

1. Lincoln's View of the Constitution During Wartime
The President responded swiftly to the assault on Fort Sumter in
April 1861 by unilaterally ordering a blockade of Confederate ports
and the summary seizure of all merchant vessels (and their cargoes)
within the forbidden zone-even against shipowners who were
unaware of the blockade.8 6 With similar boldness, Lincoln suspended
the writ of habeas corpus, 7 even though the Constitution lodged that
power in Congress. 8 Likewise, Lincoln banned disloyal speech and
publications despite possible First Amendment concerns 9 and established military tribunals with broad jurisdiction.9 0 Especially breathtaking was Lincoln's claim that his power as Commander in Chief
allowed him to free all the slaves in rebellious areas, 9 1 a policy judgment that appeared to be quintessentially legislative 92 (not to mention
85 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 7-8, 15-25, 115-95 (2003)
(detailing such drastic measures but generally defending their legitimacy); MARK E.
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1993).
86 These actions, which appeared to violate the Fifth Amendment, were upheld
in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665-82 (1862), discussed infta notes 100-09
and accompanying text.
87 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Taney,
C.J.) (describing and condemning this suspension).
88 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (analyzing habeas corpus). Lincoln
ordered the detention of thousands of civilians without trial. See FARBER, supra note
85, at 19-20, 144, 157; NEELY, supra note 85, at 113-38.
89 See FARBER, supra note 85, at 17, 118, 144, 164, 170-74 (citing numerous
examples).
90 See id. at 8, 20, 144-46, 163-75; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2831-34 (2006) (Thomas,J., dissenting) (describing Lincoln's military commissions).
Lincoln also expanded the military, called for volunteers, and committed millions of
dollars to the war effort, despite the Constitution's delegation of such powers to
Congress. See FARBER, supra note 85, at 17-18, 117-20, 132-33, 135-38, 192, 196-97.
91 See PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 187-89
(1994).

92 The Emancipation Proclamation made concrete Lincoln's earlier statements
that, as President, he would not obey the Court's constitutional interpretation in Dred
Scott. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney
General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1017, 1022 (1987). Even Justice Curtis, an
ardent Unionist who had resigned from the Court to protest Dred Scott, lamented that
Lincoln had exceeded his Article I1 powers with the Emancipation Proclamation and
some of his other actions. See 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. 306-35
(Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1879); cf FARBER, supra note 85, at 19, 21, 144-45,
152-57 (conceding the extraordinary nature of this Proclamation, noting that it
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according to Dred Scott v.
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Sandford-3 ).
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The majority of Justices, however, pragmatically
approach.
94 in which Taney tried
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9
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-including Merryman,
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the Union.
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violated"? 98 Two years later,99 Congress
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a
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93 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
(No. 9,487) (Taney, C.J.).
94 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861)
95 Id. at 148-52.
96 Id. at 147-49, 152-53.
Message to
at 38-39 (quoting Abraham Lincoln,
97 See REHNQUIST, supra note 10,
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Congress in Special Session (July
supra
FARBER,
John Hay eds., 1905)); see also
COLN 297, 309 (John A. Nicolay and
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CONGRESS
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12 Stat. 755.
99 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81,
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Unlike Taney, most of the other Justices got the message. In The
Prize Cases,'00 the Court sustained Lincoln's blockade of Confederate
ports and his seizure without due process of all transgressing vessels
and their cargoes. 10 1 The majority held that the President's power as
Commander in Chief included unreviewable discretion to "'determine what degree of force the crisis demands,'"102 such as the deployment of warships to enforce the blockade. 10 3 Whether Lincoln had
acted within the scope of his constitutional duties was "a question to
be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions
and acts of the political department of the Government to which this
power was entrusted." 10 4 The Court also rejected the argument that
Lincoln had acted unlawfully because Congress had not declared war
or specifically authorized his measures, instead creatively interpreting
existing federal laws as generally empowering the President to employ
the army and navy to quell domestic insurrections.' 0 5 Moreover, the
Court maintained that Congress's later approval of Lincoln's order
resolved any potential legal problems. 10 6 Chief Justice Taney joined
Justice Nelson's dissent, which contended that Lincoln had lacked
constitutional authority to unilaterally order the blockade and
seizures and that later congressional endorsement could not cure this
1
unconstitutional usurpation.

0 7

The Prize Cases seemingly accepted Lincoln's claim that Article II
grants the President virtually unlimited-and judicially unreviewable-power to take any actions he considers essential to address an
emergency.10 8 Nonetheless, the Court strained to avoid the full impli100 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
101 Id. at 665-82.
102 Id. at 670.
103 Id. at 666-70.
104 Id. at 670.
105 Id. at 668 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 443; Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424). The Court acknowledged, however, that the President had the
duty to resist a rebellion or invasion by force without waiting for particular congressional authorization. Id. at 668-69. This Article II power to respond militarily to an
emergency, however, did not amount to a declaration or initiation of war. Id. at 660,
668.
106 Id. at 670-71 (setting forth statute).
107 See id. at 697-98 (Nelson, J., dissenting, joined by Taney, C.J., and Catron and
Clifford, JJ.) (stressing that only Congress, not the President, could determine that a
state of war existed).
108 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71
U. CHI.

L. REv. 691 (2004) (book review) (arguing that Lincoln correctly believed

that the President's sworn constitutional duty to "preserve, protect and defend" the
entire Constitution (and the nation) supplied a "meta-principle" of interpretation: All
actions necessary to save the Union justified the temporary sacrifice of individual con-
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cations of this theory by emphasizing Congress's constitutional role,
both in generally authorizing Presidents to put down rebellions and in
specifically endorsing Lincoln's possibly extra-constitutional
measures.10 9
The judiciary's kid-gloves approach continued in Ex parte
Vallandigham, 10° which involved a constitutional challenge to a sentence imposed by a military commission established by a U.S. Army
stitutional provisions whose full enforcement would threaten to destroy the country).
As Lincoln put it: "'[Measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the [C]onstitution, through the preservation of the nation."' See id. at 721 (quoting Letter from Abraham Lincoln to
Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
1859-1865, at 585, 585 (Dan E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989)).
109 Some scholars have contended that Article I1 does not grant the President
bottomless implied authority to resolve national crises. See supra note 58 (citing
Professors Ely and Monaghan). Rather, executive actions such as those taken by Lincoln are unconstitutional, and the President must later request Congress's approvaland can be held accountable through impeachment or other sanctions if Congress
determines that the President lacked justification for his actions. See FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 11, at 263; Note, supra note 61, at 1829-30 n.83.
Indeed, even Lincoln conceded that many of his actions were of dubious constitutionality and sought later endorsement of them from Congress. He also understood that
only Congress could appropriate the funds necessary to wage the war successfully. See
FARBER, supra note 85, at 18-19, 24, 118, 137-45, 192-95, 197 (acknowledging that
the President must have some independent ability to defend the nation in true emergencies, but maintaining that he must remain legally and morally answerable for his
conduct to Congress); see also David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent
PresidentialPower, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 174-80, 192-93 (2002) (asserting that
Lincoln properly recognized the longstanding Anglo-American principle of "retroactive ratification" whereby the President could break the law in an emergency and then
seek congressional approval for his actions). But see CORWIN, supra note 53, at 23-24,
167 (concluding that Lincoln initially assumed that the validity of his interim emergency measures depended upon later legislative ratification, but that by 1863 he had
come to believe that the President had extraordinary independent constitutional
authority in wartime).
I reject the notion that Congress can make unconstitutional conduct constitutional. Rather, Article 1I either does or does not give the President power to respond
to a crisis that imperils America, I believe that the Constitution necessarily provides
for its own preservation, and that only the President is institutionally equipped to save
the nation in such a situation. The reason is structural: Whereas Congress and the
courts are in session for fixed periods, the President alone is continuously on duty
and thus can immediately deal with sudden attacks and rebellions. Moreover, even if
Congress happens to be in session when an emergency arises, its large membership
prevents the immediate action that may be necessary to preserve the status quo. For a
detailed elaboration of the foregoing thesis, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 131-204, 351-63 (2005).
110 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
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conciliatory plan to reconbecame President and pursued Lincoln's
opposition from the Radical
struct the South, he encountered bitter
and who eventually impeached
Republicans who controlled Congress
Justices understandably showed
him.1 1 6 In this political climate, the
Johnson than Congress.
more willingness to confront President117
the Court granted a writ of
For instance, in Ex parte MUlligan,
who had been found guilty of
habeas corpus to an Indiana citizen
by
government and sentenced to death
conspiracy against the federal
a
had
. 1 8 The Court concluded that Milligan
a military commission
served
trial because he had never
constitutional right to a regular jury
civil courts in Indiana had always
in the armed forces and because the
1 19
President, [nior any commander
remained open : "[Neither] the
Congress, [can] institute tribunals
under him, without the sanction of
either of soldiers or civilians,
for the trial and punishment of offenses,
which justifies what it comunless in cases of a controlling necessity,
for
that "the Constitution ... is a law
pels."12 0 The Court proclaimed
the
and in peace, and covers with
rulers and people, equally in war
of men, at all times, and under all
shield of its protection all classes
however, conflicted with the
circumstanceS."121 This lofty rhetoric,
following frank admission:
temper of the times did not
During the late wicked Rebellion, the
discussion so necessary to a
allow that calmness in deliberation and
question. Then, considercorrect conclusion of a purely judicial
exercise of power; and feelations of safety were mingled with the
happily terminated. Now that
ings and interests prevailed which are
as well as others, can be
the public safety is assured, this question, the admixture of any elepassion or
122
discussed and decided withoutlegal
judgment.
a
form
to
ment not required
OF
IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL

BENEDtCr, THE
The classic study is MICHAEL LES
(1973).
89-95
ANDREW JOHNSON 1-5,
117 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
118 Id. at 107-08, 118-27.
119 Id.at 120-21, 127.
120 Id. at 139-40 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
Four Justices avoided the constitutional
121 Id. at 120-21 (majority opinion).
in Milligan's
that the use of a military commission
questions and instead concluded
at 132-42
id.
See
Congress.
by
to the President
case exceeded the authority granted
(Chase, C.J., concurring).
(asserting
See RossITER, supra note 84, at 30-39
emer122 Id.at 109 (majority opinion).
the
and
died
issued after Lincoln had
that the Court's "lecture" in Milligan,
President's
the
of
all
to
with itscapitulation
gency had passed, cannot be squared
the creation of military commissions-and
War-including
actions during the Civil
the Constitution is

116

law of
Presidents); id. at 39 ("IT]he
has had no impact on future
later.").
said
Court
the
what
not
and
what Lincoln did in the crisis,
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this same logic in two cases
Moreover, the Court did not apply
the Reconstruction Acts (passed
challenging the constitutionality of
military governments in each
over Johnson's veto), which established
2 4 the Court invoked the
23 First, in Georgia v. Stanton,'
Southern state.'

to hear a claim that enforcement
political question doctrine to refuse
abolish the existing
of martial law in Georgia would unconstitutionally
12 6 upheld Congress's
25 Second, Ex parte McCardle
state government.'
jurisdiction in a pending case
power to repeal the Court's appellate
imprisoned for libeling Missisbrought by a petitioner who had been
the Reconstrucgovernment and who sought to void
sippi's military
1 27
tion Acts.

Reconstruction, the rigor of
Overall, during the Civil War and
more on political than legal considjudicial review seemed to depend
deferred to Lincoln in The Prize
erations. For example, the Court
it
and McCardle, perhaps because
Cases and to Congress in Stanton
their actions would have been
feared that any judgment invalidating
brief shining moment in Milligan
ignored. Conversely, the Court's
of the Johnson Adminismay have reflected the political vulnerability
individual constitutional rights
tration as much as a desire to vindicate
corpus.
through the hallowed writ of habeas
C.

Two World Wars and PresidentialAscendancy

followed the path blazed by
Twentieth-century Presidents
the challenges of World War I, WoodLincoln. For example, to meet
to enact sweeping legislation institutrow Wilson persuaded Congress
resources for the war effort, and
ing a draft, mobilizing domestic
28 The Court played
Amendment.
effectively suspending the First
federal laws banning both "sedialong. Most notoriously, it sustained
about federal officials or the
tion" (i.e., disloyal or abusive language
obstruction of military recruitmilitary) and "espionage" (including
ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
123 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867,
124 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
497-501
v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475,
125 Id. at 76-77; see also Mississippi
acts or of
congressional
of
validity
the constitutional
(1866) (declining to determine
appropripursuant to those statutes, to use
discretion,
of
exercise
PresidentJohnson's
ate force in Southern military districts).
126 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
& Pildes, supranote 20, at 15-17 (arguing
127 Id. at 508-09, 512-15; see Issacharoff
method
adopted an "institutional process"
that the Court in McCardle properly
rights"
choices and rejected the "constitutional
focused on congressional policy
approach of Milligan).
statutes and the
at 94-96 (describing the relevant
128 See ROSSITER, supra note 84,
Court's decisions upholding them).
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ment or enlistment and attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
or refusal of duty) on the ground that the government's interest in
winning the war outweighed the free speech rights of those who criticized the war (e.g., by encouraging draft resistance).1 29 In other
cases, the Court held the conduct of foreign relations to be a political
question. 130

Similarly, the Justices capitulated to Franklin Roosevelt's exercise
of extraordinarily broad authority over military and foreign affairs.
Even before World War II, the Court declared in United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.13 1 that "the very delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations" did not require express
constitutional or legislative authorization. 1 32 Although Curtiss-Wright
itself involved military orders by Roosevelt that had been approved by
134
Congress, 133 many of his other pre-war actions had not.

129 The seminal case is Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge by leafletters who had been convicted under
the Espionage Act for obstructing military recruitment and encouraging insubordination); see also United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 416 (1921) (validating a provision of the Espionage Act that the Postmaster General invoked to revoke the mailing privileges of an antiwar newspaper);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (sustaining the conviction of
Eugene Debs under the Espionage and Sedition Acts for criticizing the government's
intervention in the war and preventing recruiting). The Court acknowledged that
such laws, if they had been applied during peacetime, might well have run afoul of
free speech guarantees. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; see also MAY,supra note 37, at
1-2, 13-16, 191-253 (contending that the federal government's abusive assertion of
.war powers" during World War I and its aftermath led the Court to reassess, and
ultimately abandon, its practice of refusing to review the constitutionality of such
legislation).
130 See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-04 (1918) (deeming nonjusticiable the government's recognition of the proper sovereign in a foreign country).
131 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
132 Id. at 320.
133 Id. at 312-13, 333 (upholding Roosevelt's proclamation directing military
officers to prevent violation of an arms embargo with certain South American countries, which had been issued pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress granting him
discretion over this matter).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937) (sustaining the
validity of the President's establishment of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and
the Soviet Union); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
110-13 (1973) (noting that, before Congress declared war in 1941, Roosevelt had
sent American troops to the North Atlantic, declared a state of "unlimited national
emergency," and ordered the Navy to shoot Nazi U-boats on sight).
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During World War II, the Court accepted the government's
claims that national security justified the suppression of individual
rights and liberties. Two cases are especially illuminating.
First, in Ex parte Quirin,15 the Justices construed an ambiguous
statute as authorizing the President to use his own military tribunals to
try "enemy combatants" for violating the laws of war, thereby avoiding
the need to address Roosevelt's assertion that he had independent
constitutional power to do so. 13 6 The Court sustained a tribunal's
death sentences imposed on avowed Nazi saboteurs (including one
American citizen) who had surreptitiously entered the United States,
despite their argument in a habeas corpus petition that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments guaranteed their right to a trial in a civil court
with full constitutional protections-not procedures fashioned by the
President. 13 7 The Justices did not mention that Roosevelt had indicated his intent to execute these saboteurs regardless of any contrary
judicial order. 38 The Court reaffirmed the validity of military com1 39
missions in other cases, most notably In re Yamashita.
135 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
136 Id. at 21-30, 38-39, 45-48. The relevant Act of Congress stated that its provisions describing courts martial "shall not be construed as depriving military commissions ...of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute
or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions." Id. at 27 (citing
Arts. 12, 15, 38, 46, 81, 82 of the Articles of War (recodified by Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1950))). The Court
read this language as a congressional grant of power to the President. Id. at 27-28.
However, this statute could also have been read (and likely was intended) as recognizing the President's independent authority to use military commissions when allowed
by the law of war. SeeWuerth, supra note 82, at 1574 n.55. The Court's clever interpretation provided a convenient way for it to uphold FDR's actions in a situation
where attempting to thwart him would have proved futile. See infra note 138 and
accompanying text.
137 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22-48.
138 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution:JusticeJackson
and theJapaneseExclusion Cases, 2002 Sut,. CTr. REv. 455, 489-90; see also Katyal & Tribe,
supra note 8, at 1291 ("[Slome highly questionable ex parte arm-twisting by the executive may have spurred the Supreme Court's unanimous decision."). The public overwhelmingly supported the trial of the saboteurs by military commission, expressed
outrage at the Court's decision to intervene, and applauded its snap judgment (issued
the day after oral argument) allowing the tribunal to proceed. See Goldsmith &
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 266-67. The Court issued an explanatory opinion months
later, after the executions had been carried out. See Neal Katyal, The ChangingLaws of
War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After September II? SunsettingJudicial Opinions, 79
NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 1237, 1252-53 (2004).
139 327 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1946). In that case, a military commission used special
procedural and evidentiary rules that deviated from ordinary court-martial practice,
and it convicted and sentenced to death ajapanese general for war crimes (failing to
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Second, in Korematsu v. United States,' 40 the Court ruled that the
executive branch's determination (endorsed by Congress) that Japanese-Americans on the West Coast had to be excluded from coastal
areas to prevent espionage and sabotage on behalf ofJapan warranted

14 1
the infringement of their due process and equal protection rights.
Recognizing that, absent such a dire emergency, the compulsory evacuation of large groups of citizens from their homes would have violated the Constitution, the Court stated:

To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we
are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and
felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they
decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily .... [T]he need for action was great, and time was
short. [The judiciary] cannot-by availing (itself] of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at that time these actions were
2
unjustified. 14
prevent his troops from committing atrocities in the Philippines). Id. at 5-6. The
Court tpheld the denial of General Yamashita's habeas petition on the ground that
he did not enjoy the protection of Article 38 of the laws of war or the Geneva Conventions of 1929. Id. at 7-24. The majority refused to second-guess the President's determination that this military commission was necessary (even though it had been
convened after the war had ended) or his choice of procedural rules. Id. at 12-13,
18-23; see also Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948) (per curiam) (denying
habeas relief to Nazis who had been convicted by a U.S. military tribunal at Nuremberg). Quiin, Yamashita, and many other cases illustrate that "it]he Supreme Court
of the United States cannot be expected, indeed has no right, to set itself up as a sort
of supermilitary commission to oversee the worldwide activities of the punitive tribunals that the President has authorized." ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 118-19.
140 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
141 Id. at 215-25. General Dewitt issued this specific exclusion order pursuant to
Roosevelt's more general Executive Order, which in turn had been ratified by
Congress. Id, at 215-17.
142 Id. at 223-24. Similarly, the Court sustained the conviction of an American
citizen of Japanese descent for violating a curfew order issued at the executive's discretion under a broad congressional delegation of power. Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 91-94 (1943). According to the Court:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality ....We may assume that these considerations would be
controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and
sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military
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In dissent, Justice Jackson suggested that judges lacked sufficient
information to intelligently examine executive claims of military
necessity. 14 3 He then argued that the Court, having asserted jurisdiction, had a duty to strike down this exclusion order because it clearly
1 44
violated the constitutional rights- of citizens of Japanese descent.
The Court did, however, allow an individual to challenge her
detention after the forced transfer had taken place. Mitsuye Endo
filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the government, through its
War Relocation Authority (WRA), had violated her due process right
to liberty by detaining her without charges and without disputing her
claim of patriotism.1 45 The Court avoided this constitutional question
by holding that Congress had not authorized such imprisonment:
Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not of race, creed, or
color. He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur.
When the power to detain is derived from the [statutory] power to
protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention
46
which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized.'
Nonetheless, Endo hardly represents a courageous rebuke to government overreaching, for two reasons. First, Congress had approved
and funded the relocation prison camps with Roosevelt's support, and
the Court's absurd statutory interpretation to the contrary absolved
Congress and the President of responsibility for violating the constitutional rights of Japanese-Americans by shifting blame to a lowly
authorities to scntinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.
Id. at 100.
143 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Particularly astute is his
observation that the "chief restraint" on the President and his military commanders is
.their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the
moral judgments of history." Id. at 248.
144 Id. at 246-48. He made the crucial point that the Court's validation of the
government's discrimination, by establishing a constitutional principle that could be
invoked to justify similar repression in the future, was far worse than the military
order itself, which was temporary. Id. at 245-46. Two otherJustices contended that
the Court had abdicated its responsibility to enforce the Constitution by allowing such
unjustified discrimination. See id. at 225-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233-42
(Murphy, J., dissenting). For an excellent analysis of the Japanese relocation policy
and cases, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
145 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298-302 (1944).
146 Id. at 302; see also id. at 297, 300-04 (construing the statute). See Sunstein,
supra note 22, at 83-85, 90-93 (arguing that the Court during World War If declined
to decide the extent of the President's constitutional war powers, but rather upheld
the President when he acted pursuant to congressional authorization (Korematsu and
Hirabayashi) and" rebuffed him when he did not (Endo)).
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agency, the WRA. 4 7 Second, the Justices delayed deciding the case
until the day after Roosevelt announced he would end the
48
internment.

1

Overall, the Court deferred to Roosevelt's Lincolnesque assertion
of remarkably broad power to win a war that threatened the existence
of the United States and all other democracies. The majority of Justices correctly realized that, in such dire circumstances, they could do
little to thwart our longest-serving President, who enjoyed immense
popular and congressional support and who had no compunction
about challenging the Court. 149 Cases like Quiin and Korematsu are
sobering reminders of the limits on judicial review in wartime.
It is worth noting, however, that the year after FDR died and
World War II ended, the Court declined to extend Quiin. Rather, in
147 See Kang, supra note 9, at 260-61, 268-75. Endo vividly demonstrates the
naivet6 of assuming that the Court engages in an impartial effort to ascertain whether
or not Congress authorized a particular wartime action. See supra notes 23-25, 28 and
accompanying text.
148 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 84 n.167 (making this point, but noting that
some historians have debated the timing issue); see also RoSSITER, supranote 84, at 47
(emphasizing that the Court decided Endo only after the military area had been disestablished and the relocation camps were being broken up). In another example of
convenient timing, Roosevelt successfully seized over sixty plants where labor disputes
had impeded the war effort, but the Court waited until the end of the war to consider
a legal challenge to these seizures. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United States, 326
U.S. 690 (1945) (directing the lower court to dismiss the case as moot because the
government had returned the disputed property); see also RossITER, supra note 84, at
59-63 (describing the Court's response to FDR's seizures).
149 The lone President to serve more than two terms, Roosevelt was elected four
times with resounding majorities. See David Leip's Atlas, supra note 115, at
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (select "General by Year," then follow 1932,
1936, 1940, and 1944). In 1935, when the Justices considered his decision to take the
United States off the gold standard, he was "in the event of an unfavorable ruling,
prepared to defy the Court and precipitate a constitutional crisis." See William E.
Leuchtenberg, Charles Hughes: The Center Holds, 83 N.C. L. R~v. 1187, 1191 (2005).
When the Court in 1935-1936 invalidated several.critical New Deal statutes, Roosevelt
famously proposed to appoint six new Justices to overrule such decisions. Moreover,
FDR chose as his appointees not independent-minded jurists, but rather political professionals sympathetic to his policies. See William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as
Political Spoils, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 525, 525 (2005). These Justices almost certainly
understood that Roosevelt was unlikely to alter his war policies because of an adverse
Court holding. As his Attorney General famously remarked, Roosevelt illustrated that
"[t] he Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President." FRANcis BIDDLE,
IN BRIEF AUTHOpIT
219 (1962); see Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 278
(describing the popularity of, and respect commanded by, Roosevelt and Biddle); see
also CORWIN, supranote 53, at 287 (stressing that FDR, like Lincoln, asserted power to
effectively suspend the Constitution if he determined that doing so was necessary to
win a war).
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Duncan v. Kahanamoku,'50 it held that a federal statute imposing martial law in Hawaii, which did not mention military commissions,
should be read as prohibiting the executive from using such commissions where the civil courts remained open and loyal civilian citizens
had been charged with garden-variety crimes that had no impact on
national security.' 5 ' Thus, as in Milligan, the Court attempted to salvage some restraints on the government's exercise of war powers after
52
the immediate crisis had passed.'
D.

The Cold War and the Modern Era

After World War 11, the Court sent out mixed signals about its
willingness to engage in serious judicial review of presidential actions
in military and foreign affairs. On the one hand, it declared in 1948
that
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither the aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
53
judicial intrusion or inquiry.'
150 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
151 Id. at 315-23. The Court emphasized that this case involved loyal citizens, and
thus it did not question military jurisdiction over enemy belligerents in cases like
Quiin. Id. at 313, 319. The Court also conceded that the federal organic act governing Hawaii did not clearly address military commissions, but declared that it would
resolve this ambiguity in favor of preserving judicial procedures. Id. at 319-23. Once
again, the Justices did not interpret a statute to glean Congress's intent (which was
indeterminate), but rather simply implemented extra-statutory principles.
152 See Scheindlin & Schwartz, supra note 84, at 839-40 (pointing out that, as the
exigencies of World War 11 decreased, the Court reasserted its role in cases like Endo
and Kahanamoku); see also Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at 2572, 2576 (contending that
such decisions serve a valuable function by creating some legal constraints on the
government in responding to future emergencies). Whether such limits have teeth is
debatable; Milligan had little effect on Presidents' conduct of later wars, especially
World War II. See RossriER, supra note 84, at 52-59, 127-29 (concluding that the
Court imposes restrictions after the emergency has passed, thereby making them
more theoretical than practical in the context of fighting an actual war).
153 Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948);
see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495 (1951) (upholding the Smith Act,
which effectively made it a crime to be a member of (or support) the Communist
Party).
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illustrated this deferential
Two key cases involving military tribunals
approach.
First in ohnson v. Eisentrager,15 4 the Court held that nonresident
in China, convicted there of war
enemy aliens who had been captured
an
commission, and transferred to
crimes by a United States military
had no right to federal judicial
American military prison in Germany
aliens, undelayed and
5 5
"Executive power over enemy
access:
history,
been deemed, throughout our
unhampered by litigation, has 5 6
extend
to
courts
Allowing federal
essential to war-time security."'
their territorial jurisdiction would
the writ of habeas corpus beyond
and
enemies by imposing large risks
hinder the war effort and aid our
witand caring for prisoners and their
costs (especially in transporting
of commanding officers and
nesses), undermining the authority
federal
generating friction between
diverting their attention, and
157 Accordingly, the Court refused to reexamjudges and the military.
commission-an institution with
58
ine the proceedings of the military
offenses against the law of war.'
punish
to
authority
well-established
159 affirmed a military tribunal's jurisSecond, Madsen v. Kinsella
husStates citizen for murdering her
diction to try a civilian United
of
area
in the American-occupied
band, a lieutenant serving
that Congress had long acknowl60
Germany.1 The Court emphasized
miliCommander in Chief to establish
edged the President's power as
...
"urgent and infinite responsibility
tary commissions as part of6 1his
of combating the enemy"' :
commissions have been constiSince our nation's earliest days, such
meeting many urgent governtutionally recognized agencies for
Neither their procedure
....
ment responsibilities related to war

339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Id. at 767-77.
rule from
(citing the Court's adherence to this
156 Id. at 774; see also id. at 776-77
limited
obtain
By contrast, a resident alien could
the early days of the Republic).
was, in
he
whether
a state of war existed and
judicial review to determine whether
784.
fact, an enemy alien. d. at 775-76,
had
Quiin as involving saboteurs who
distinguished
at
157 Id. at 777-79. The Court
d.
there.
occurring
actions
United States for
jailed
been captured and tried within the
been
and
Yamashita had committed offenses
779-80. Similarly, the prisoners in
at 780-81.
Id.
territory.
and tried within American-controlled
158 Id. at 786-87.
159 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
160 Id. at 342-62.
161 Id. at 348.
154
155
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nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute. It has been
2
adapted in each instance to the need that called it forth.'1
1 63
On the other hand, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
the Court rejected President Truman's claim that Article II implicitly
authorized him to order the seizure and operation of American steel
mills to avert a nationwide strike that threatened steel production vital
to the Korean War effort.' 64 The majority held that Truman had
usurped Congress's power to make laws in the domestic policy arena
because the Labor Management Relations Act did not authorize the
executive to seize property to settle labor disputes. 1 65 Nor did the
President have power to take this action as Commander in Chief, as
would have been true if he had been directing the armed forces in the
6
foreign theater of war.1

6

In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson argued that the Constitution's text, history, and precedent did not reveal any "useful and
unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive
power," but rather provided "quotations from respected sources on
1 67
each side of any question . . . [that] largely cancel each other."
Accordingly, he urged a flexible, pragmatic approach recognizing that
"Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."1 6 Jackson
identified three main categories. First, where Congress authorizes the
President's action, a very strong presumption of constitutionality
arises, rebuttable only on a showing that the federal government as a
162 Id. at 346-48. The Court concluded that Congress, in Article of War 15, had
extensively regulated courts-martial but had preserved the existing jurisdiction of
executive branch military commissions over common-law war crimes, consistent with
historical practice and with precedent like Quirin and Yamashita. Id. at 347-55; cf
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (ruling that a civilian living in America could not
constitutionally be tried by court martial for murder allegedly committed when he
was in the Air Force); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-15 (1957) (holding that an American citizen who had been convicted of murdering her husband, a U.S. military officer
stationed outside of an occupied war zone (England), had been denied her constitutional right to ajury trial); United States v. Verdugo, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (limiting Reid's application to American citizens, not aliens).
163 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
164 See id. at 582-89.
165 See id. at 585-86 (supporting this conclusion by pointing out that Congress had
rejected an amendment that would have empowered governmental seizures of property in cases of emergency). Because Congress had not authorized the President's
actions, he could not claim to be merely exercising his Article II power to execute the
law. Id. at 587-88.
166 See id. at 587.
167 See id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 635.
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whole lacks power.1 69 Second, where statutes are silent, "a zone of
twilight [exists] in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which distribution is uncertain," and in such
cases "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law."1 70 Third,
[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium estab17 1
lished by our constitutional system.
Justice Jackson concluded that the seizure of the steel mills fell into
this third category.1 72 He rejected Truman's argument that the executive had virtually unlimited inherent authority as Commander in
Chief to meet emergencies such as war, but rather interpreted the
Constitution as enabling Congress to expand the President's powers
as it deems necessary to deal with such threats. 17 3 Yet Jackson
acknowledged that Congress had to exercise such power or would lose
it.

1

74

Chief Justice Vinson and two colleagues dissented on the ground
that various statutes did authorize the President's action' 7 5 and that,
in any event, Truman had independent Article II power to take steps
he thought necessary to win the Korean War. 176 This dissent again
demonstrates that the question of legal authorization for the exercise
of war powers is often contestable.
In brief, the majority apparently felt that the Korean War posed a
far less critical threat than World War I, that Truman had proceeded
169 Id. at 635-37.
170 Id. at 637.
171 Id. at 637-38.
172 Id. at 640.
173 Id. at 640-55.
174 Id. at 654.
175 Congress had given the President vast power to prosecute the war in Korea and
had instituted wage and price controls to ensure production of key commodities like
steel. Id. at 668-72 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice contended that (1)
Truman had a duty to execute these laws and to determine how they could best be
harmonized with the Labor Management Relations Act, and (2) no federal statutory
provision prohibited taking property as necessary to vindicate Congress's wartime
policies. Id. at 672-79, 701-10.
176 Id. at 680-700 (setting forth a detailed history of presidential actions during
wartime, including seizures of property).
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without any clear congressional approval, that he had overstepped his
constitutional bounds, and that fundamental Fifth Amendment rights
were at stake. None of the Justices mentioned that in 1952 Truman
lacked the popularity and political capital to resist the Court's
judgment.

77

The Court eventually adopted Justice Jackson's analytical
model.1 7 Nonetheless, it has applied this framework with varying
degrees of rigor, often to reach results that are at odds with Jackson's
views. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,179 the Court sustained
President Carter's order suspending private claims in American courts
against Iran, even though no statute had expressly authorized this
suspension, on the ground that Congress had done so implicitly by
acquiescing to similar executive acts in the past.18 0 Indeed, in almost
See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a KindP, 19 CONST.
63, 64-75 (2002) (concluding that the Court reflected the tide of public
opinion, which had turned decisively against Truman because he had asserted unlimited executive power to fight a war that most Americans no longer supported).
Youngstown was "the backlash to the legally clumsy attempt, by a famously unpopular
President, to invoke national security as the justification for seizing steel mills during
a labor dispute in 1952, an election year in which control of the White House subsequently shifted from one party to the other." J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience:
The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 CoNsr. COMMENT. 37, 42 (2002). Sidak
argues that Justice Jackson's eloquent statement of liberty-based limits on presidential
prerogatives has been supplanted by the experience of 9/11, which demonstrated the
truly compelling nature of the government's interest in defending its citizens. Id. at
37-42, 53-61.
178 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981). The Court
has struck down a few measures justified as exercises of war powers, albeit not involving presidential military decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262
(1967) (declaring unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting Communists from working in defense plants); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-67 (1963)
(invalidating a statute taking away the citizenship of anyone who had evaded service
in World War 11 or the Korean War).
179 453 U.S. 654.
180 Id. at 656, 669-88; see KoH, supra note 11, at 139-40 (maintaining that the
Court "inverted the Steel Seizure holding" by suggesting that " [ i]n responding to perceived national crises, the president should act first, then search for preexisting congressional blank checks, rather than seek specific prior approval of controversial
decisions"). But see Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 87, 91-93 (2002) (claiming that Youngstown's significance is more
symbolic than doctrinal, as it provides few concrete legal guidelines to resolve disputes, particularly concerning whether the President has acted in accordance with
Congress's implied will); id. at 93-95, 125-54 (criticizing the Court's tendency to
avoid constitutional questions through dubious statutory interpretations and recommending that it assess Congress's authorization of executive conduct by applying ordinary delegation principles and, if it finds authorization lacking, resolving issues about
the scope of the President's constitutional powers).
177

COMMENT.
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every major case after Youngstown, the judiciary has deferred to the
executive in military and foreign affairs. 81 For instance, federal
courts consistently rejected constitutional challenges to the
undeclared wars in Vietnam, 182 Nicaragua, 183 and the Persian Gulf.18 4
Thus, there is little support for the notion that the judiciary has gradually become more vigorous in exercising judicial review over military
1

decisions.-

181 See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (accepting the President's
decision continuing the embargo against Cuba); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 304-07
(1981) (sustaining the Secretary of State's revocation of the passport of a dangerous
former CIA agent and remarking that "it is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation" (quoting
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964))). See generally Mark E. Brandon,
War and the American Constitutional Order, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1815, 1856 (2003) (expressing skepticism about scholars' pronouncements that cases like Youngstown have led
to the demise of the line of precedent epitomized by the Prize Cases and Korematsu).
182 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 (2d Cir. 1973);
Sarnoffv. Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. United States,
406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1969). Although most courts denied such claims on political question grounds, some asserted limited power to determine whether Congress
had participated in the decision to wage war-for example, by passing resolutions and
making necessary appropriations. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43
(2d Cir. 1971); see also Corn, supra note 26, at 218-31 (summarizing Vietnam War
cases). In Gilliganv. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court held that military training
and procedures raised political questions, and hence dismissed a complaint alleging
that negligent training of the National Guard had led to the shooting of antiwar
protestors at Kent State. Id. at 6-9; see Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political
Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1167-78 (1970) (criticizing the judiciary's refusal to review constitutional challenges to the Vietnam War).
The leading counterexample is New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (rejecting the Nixon Administration's claim that national security overrode a
newspaper's First Amendment right to publish the "Pentagon Papers," which
contained confidential and embarrassing information about America's involvement
in Vietnam).
183 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
184 See, e.g., Dellumsv. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141,1152 (D.D.C. 1990);Angev. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 509, 518 (D.D.C. 1990). This tradition continued when courts declined
to entertain challenges to President Clinton's military intervention in the former
Yugoslavia. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
185 See Devins 8c Fisher, supra note 177, at 75-84 (accusing the modern Court of
abdicating its duty to enforce the Constitution's written limits on the government,
reflecting the public's view that the President is the source of military power and the
failure of Congress, for political reasons, to assert its constitutional prerogatives).

Professor Cole has acknowledged that judges, in the midst of national security crises,
have been overly deferential and have rarely provided relief to victims of unconstitutional conduct. See Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at 2565-66, 2568-71; Cole, Morality,

1046

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82"3

E. Summary
The Court's precedent concerning presidential power during
wartime does not follow a linear progression yielding clear-cut rules.
Rather, the cases vary and are heavily fact-dependent. Generally, the
Court has deferred to the President, either treating his assertion of
authority as raising political questions (e.g., Mott, The Prize Cases, Vallandigham, and Eisentrager) or upholding his actions after a lenient
s 6 However, in
review on the merits (e.g., Quifin and Korematsu).18
decisions like Milligan, Kahanamoku, and Youngstown, the Court has
checked the President and championed individual rights. The degree
of deference to the executive ebbs and flows based upon myriad (and
often highly subjective) factors, including (1) the seriousness and
urgency of the military crisis, and the importance of the specific presidential measure in resolving it; (2) the presence or absence of congressional endorsement for the executive's action; (3) the significance
of the individual legal rights at stake; and (4) the political strength of
the President and the likelihood he will obey the Court's judgment

supra note 8, at 1761-62. Nonetheless, he maintains that the eventual condemnation
of such bad decisions, and the Court's announcement of legal standards in wartime
cases (particularly those decided after the immediate crisis has passed), gradually
have limited the options the political branches can exercise in future emergencies
(e.g., today detention based solely on race would not be tolerated). See Cole, Judging,
supra note 8, at 2566, 2571-77; Cole, Morality, supra note 8, at 1762-63; cf Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu ? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 273, 283-307 (arguing that past instances of what society comes to see as unjustifiable incursions on civil liberties progressively reduce the scope of such violations,
but that new threats generate novel policy responses that endanger constitutional
rights in different ways).
However, I share the skepticism of other scholars who do not view modern judges
as more willing than their predecessors to check the political branches' constitutional
excesses during wartime. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1029, 1041-44 (2004); Tushnet, supra, at 305; see also Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 12, at 623-25 (dismissing as speculative the notion that government officials, including courts, will show greater restraint than in the past if grave circumstances akin to the Civil War and World War 11were to arise); cf Ackerman, supra, at
1029-91 (rejecting the absolutist civil libertarian position as unrealistic after 9/11,
and instead proposing a legal regime in which we permit emergency presidential
actions that restrict liberty but only temporarily, through a requirement that Congress
reapprove such measures by ever-increasing majorities at stated intervals).
186 See ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 5-10, 90-92, 126-42 (contending that the Court
typically has adopted a realistic attitude during wartime by dismissing cases on jurisdictional grounds or stretching the Constitution to validate government actions and
by trusting the people and Congress to check any abuses by the President).
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(considerations that are never articulated but that often seem
crucial) .187
In short, the results are unpredictable and appear to rest on an
ad hoc balancing of various legal and pragmatic elements. Thus, one
must be cautious in reading any single case (or group of cases decided
within a short period) as portending a major shift in doctrine. It is
against this background that the recent decisions involving the War
on Terrorism should be evaluated.
III.
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CASES

Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
empowered the President to employ "all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist attacks
[and] to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States."1 8 8 President Bush quickly dispatched armed forces to
Afghanistan and intensified efforts to combat domestic terrorism.
Most importantly, Bush asserted authority to indefinitely incarcerate anyone he alone identified as an "enemy combatant" and, if he
chose, to try such prisoners by a military commission of his own creation. The Court has rebuffed both of these claims. A careful examination of these decisions, however, reveals that some commentators
187 See Brandon, supra note 181, at 1833 (maintaining that the Court's flexible
balancing approach permits "fine judgments about the nature of the military conflict,
the severity of the danger to the interests of state, and the character of the claimed
fight"); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2056 (recognizing that legal
doctrine relevant to interpreting congressional authorizations of force does not
always yield "determinate answers" because judicial decisions are influenced by considerations such as perceptions of threat levels and risks to civil liberties); Powell,
supra note 12, at 528-29 (citing with approval Louis Henkin's observation that the
Court has developed few legal principles concerning presidential authority in foreign
affairs and instead resolves cases on an ad hoc basis); cf Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The
9/11 "NationalSecurity" Cases: Three Principles GuidingJudges'Decision-Making,81 OR. L.
REv. 985, 996-98 (2002) (arguing that judicial deference should be relaxed when the
President addresses domestic affairs rather than true war powers, exercises power that
the Constitution reserves to Congress, or allegedly violates the Bill of Rights); Margulies, supra note 23, at 385-443 (contending that courts should adopt an "institutional
equity" approach by examining whether the government has shown that (1) its exigent measures are justified because existing legal remedies are inadequate, and (2) its
need for flexibility in addressing a military threat outweighs the damage to the integrity of legal institutions and the hardships imposed on members of disfavored minority groups).
188 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(Supp. III 2003)).
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have exaggerated the negative impact of these cases on President
Bush's policies and on executive power generally.
A.

Cases Involving the Detention of Enemy Combatants

Enemy combatants have included a few American citizens, who
are protected by a 1971 statute providing that "[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 8 9 Two citizens and one alien who had
been labeled "enemy combatants" by the Bush Administration
brought constitutional challenges. These three cases will be analyzed
in turn.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Hamdi, an American citizen by birth who moved to Saudi Arabia
as a child, was captured in Afghanistan. 190 The United States asserted
that Hamdi had fought with the Taliban and detained him indefinitely-without formal charges-at several military prisons (most
recently, one in South Carolina). 9 1 Hamdi's father filed a habeas
petition alleging that his son had gone to Afghanistan to do relief
work.1 9 2 All of the Justices except Thomas voted to strike down the
government's actions, albeit for different reasons.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, reached two major conclusions. First, Congress's authorization to the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" implicitly included the long-recognized war power of
imprisoning "enemy combatants" for the duration of the armed conflict, and under Quiin it did not matter that Hamdi was an American
citizen 1 9 3 Second, the Due Process Clause required balancing two
crucial interests.1 94 On the one hand, Hamdi had a fundamental
right to be free from incarceration without due process 95 :
189 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
190 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
191 Id. at 511-12 (noting that this detention had been based solely upon an affidavit from a Defense Department official that Hamdi had been a Taliban fighter).
192 Id. at 511.
193 Id. at 516-23; see also id. at 519-21 (rejecting the administration's broader
claim that Hamdi could be detained indefinitely, not merely until the end of the war
in Afghanistan). Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the AUMF authorized
the imprisonment of enemy combatants. See id. at 587-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 529-32 (plurality opinion).
195 Id. at 530-31 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866)).
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[we] not give short shrift to the values that

this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizen-

ship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that
our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested;
and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at
1 96
home to the principles for which we fight abroad.
On the other hand, the government had critical interests in (1)
ensuring that those who had actually fought for the enemy not return
to battle, and (2) avoiding a trial-like process, which would distract
military officers and lead to disclosure of military secrets.1 9 7 Accommodating these competing concerns, the Court "[held] that a citizendetainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
198
neutral decisionmaker."
Justice O'Connor conceded that "the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that. .. enemy combatant proceedings be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive
at a time of ongoing military conflict."1 99 For instance, ordinary rules
2 0°
of evidence (e.g., the rule against hearsay) need not be observed.
Indeed, even an impartial, "appropriately authorized" military tribunal might meet the announced standards.20 1 The plurality asserted
that such limited procedures would have little or no impact on the
202
actual conduct of the war.
In short, the Court acknowledged the superior institutional competence of politically accountable officials over military strategy and
operations 20 3 and its special sensitivity to executive decisions in this
context.20 4 Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor declared that separation
of powers required the involvement of all three branches when military actions invaded individual liberties:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prose196 See id. at 532; see also id. at 539 (declaring that the Court must be sensitive both
to national security issues and to "the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns").
197 Id. at 531-32.
198 Id. at 533.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 533-34.
201 Id. at 538.
202 Id. at 534.
203 Id. at 531 (citing Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
204 Id. at 536.
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cution of a war, and recognize that the scope of discretion
necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those
20 5
presented here.

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that federal
courts had jurisdiction to examine Hamdi's due process claim, but
concluded that the AUMF did not provide the express, specific congressional authorization for executive imprisonment of citizens
required by the 1971 federal statute. 20 6 Although Souter did not
reach the issue of what processes should be used, he disavowed the
2 7
plurality's suggestion that a military commission might suffice.
2
Justice Scalia, along with Justice Stevens, went much further.

013

In their opinion, the Constitution allows the detention of an American citizen only pursuant to a criminal prosecution in federal court
with all attendant procedural rights, except in the rare instance when
Congress has suspended habeas corpus. 20 9 Accordingly, the President
could not circumvent this clear constitutional design by asserting that
a military emergency required different procedures against citizens
accused of aiding the enemy.2 10 Justice Scalia characterized this ban
on indefinite wartime detention of citizens as part of the Framers'
more "general distrust of military power permanently at the Execu205 Id. at 535. Therefore, the Court declined to accept the government's argument that judicial review should be limited to determining either that (1) the President had legal authority for the detention scheme, or (2) there was "some evidence"
for the individual imprisonment-a standard that could be satisfied by the executive
alone providing supporting facts. Id. at 526-27, 535-36.
206 Id. at 540-50 (Souter,J., concurring). They conceded, however, that the President might have power in "a moment of genuine emergency" to detain citizens if he
reasonably feared they might be an imminent threat to the nation. Id. at 552. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2103-06 (maintaining that Justice Souter
erred in insisting on a "clear statement" in the AUMF that citizens who were enemy
combatants could be detained, because this interpretive canon properly applied only
to protect the liberty of citizens who were noncombatants).
207 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553.
208 Id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 554-57, 564-79. Justice Scalia invoked Milligan as properly rejecting the
government's attempt to hold and convict a citizen through military processes rather
than a criminal trial in a civil court. Id. at 566-69 (citing ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866)). He then argued that Quirin had misinterpreted Milligan.
Id. at 569-73 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942)); see also id. at 573 (distinguishing Quiin on the ground that the petitioners there-including an American
citizen-had conceded they were members of enemy armed forces).
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tive's disposal." '1 1 He observed that, because the Constitution mandated ordinary criminal procedures for citizens, the plurality had no
authority to suggest new processes such as dispensing with the rules of
21 2
evidence or allowing decision by a neutral military tribunal.
Finally, Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that judicial
review should be narrowly confined to ascertaining whether the law
authorized the President to hold enemy combatants, and he found
that both Article II and the AUMF conferred such power.2 1 3 He contended that the plurality had erred in asking the further question of
whether Hamdi actually was an enemy combatant-a factual judgment entrusted solely to the President. 2 14 In Justice Thomas's view,
courts lacked the expertise and relevant information to second-guess
the President's decision, which involved delicate and complex policy
calibrations. 215 Moreover, he concluded that due process required
only that the President determine in good faith that detention was
211 Id. at 568.
212 Id. at 575-77. Justice Scalia closed by denying the applicability of the maxim
inter arma silent leges to a Constitution designed to confront and accommodate war.
Id. at 579.
Scalia's argument has received detailed support from Carlton Larson, who makes
four major points. First, Article IlI's Treason Clause incorporated the centuries-old
English understanding that anyone who owed allegiance to a nation (either citizens
or those living temporarily and openly in the country) and breached that allegiance
would be subject to trial in an ordinary court. See Larson, supra note 63, at 867-83.
Second, American courts faithfully adhered to this understanding for a century and a
half. Id. at 867-68, 884-94. Third, the Court dramatically deviated from this tradition in Quirin by allowing military jurisdiction over alleged traitors, and repeated this
mistake in Hamdi. Id. at 868, 894-99. Fourth, most terrorists who enter the United
States are engaged in treason because they are either "levying war" against it (i.e.,
using group force to usurp the federal government's functions or alter its policies) or
aiding their "enemies" (i.e., foreigners with no allegiance to America engaged in hostilities against it). Id. at 899-914; see also id. at 920-23 (contending that courts can
review the political branches' designation of someone as an "enemy," but must show
substantial deference). Ultimately, Professor Larson concludes that terrorists are not
engaged in activities so militaristic and horrific as to justify an exception that would
commit them to military jurisdiction. M. at 900, 923-26.
Although Larson's historical research is impressive, courts cannot ignore technological changes-such as the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as computerized communications-that make individual or small groups
of terrorists able to inflict infinitely more destruction than the Founders could have
imagined. Likewise, the September 11 attacks revealed the shortcomings of the previous executive approach of treating terrorists like ordinary criminals and giving them
trials in federal courts.
213 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214 See id. at 584-86.
215 See id. at 579-86.
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21 6 and hence rejected the plurality's
necessary to protect the public,
21 7
test.
crafting of a balancing

2.

Rasul v. Bush

authorizes district courts,
The federal habeas corpus statute
to hear petitions by anyone
"within their respective jurisdictions,"
of the federal Constitution,
claiming to be imprisoned in violation
219
21 8 In Rasul v. Bush,
the Court interpreted this prolaws, or treaties.
captured abroad and detained at
vision to include challenges by aliens
Bay, which by treaty is under
the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo
and control, but subject to Cuba's
America's exclusive jurisdiction
220
,ultimate sovereignty."
recognized that Johnson v.
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens
lacked constitutional habeas
221
Eisentrager had held that federal courts
had been convicted of war crimes
corpus jurisdiction over aliens who and incarcerated in Germany. 222
by a military commission overseas
on the grounds that the petitionThe Court distinguished Eisentrager
countries at war with the United
ers in Rasul were not nationals of
of aggression against America, had
States, had denied committing acts
and had been imprisoned in a
never been given access to any tribunal,
22 3 Justice Stejurisdiction.
complete
had
U.S.
the
which
over
territory
in Eisentragerhad focused on the
vens further noted that the opinion
to habeas, except for "a passing
constitutional (not statutory) right
224 The Court
authorization."
reference to the absence of statutory
Borden, 48 U.S: (7 How.) 1, 43-45 (1849),
216 See id. at 589-91 (citing Luther v.
decisions on the
distinguished Milligan and similar
and other cases). justice Thomas
been detained
had
proceedings, whereas Hamdi
ground that they involved criminal
592-93.
at
id.
See
a safety precaution.
not as a punishment but rather as
governthe plurality failed to account for the
that
(arguing
594-98
217 See id. at
war,
conducting
of
part
crucial
a
as
combatants
ment's interests in holding enemy
military
of
involvement
avoiding the
using detention to gather critical intelligence,
of confidential information).
disclosure
the
preventing
officials in litigation, and
218 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c) (3)(2000).
219 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
art.
of Land for Coaling and Naval Stations,
220 See id. at 470-85 (quoting Lease
418).
III., U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. no.
(1950).
763
U.S.
221 339
222 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
concurring) (agreeing with these distincJ.,
223 Id.; see also id. at 486-88 (Kennedy,
have had a
federal judicial interference would
tions, and stressing that in Eisentrager
the
reopening
conduct of military affairs by
harmful effect on the political branches'
miliby
sentenced
duly tried, convicted, and
case of enemy prisoners who had been
the United States' territorial jurisdiction).
outside
far
zone
tary commissions in a war
terse
The Court also concluded that Eisentragers
224 Id. at 476 (majority opinion).
in
overruled
habeas statute had been implicitly
rejection of jurisdiction under the

2007]

THE

"ENEMY

COMBATANT"

CASES

IN

HISTORICAL

CONTEXT

1053

limited its ruling as follows: "[F]ederal courts have jurisdiction to
determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of
2

wrongdoing."

25

In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas) argued that Eisentragerhad correctly interpreted the
habeas statute as not extending to aliens kept in military prisons
outside the United States' borders and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of all federal courts.

22 6

Justice Scalia reiterated the Eisentrager

Court's warning that judicial interference might produce dire consequences for the military in terms of risk, cost, hampering the war
effort, aiding our enemies, diverting commanders' attention, and
sparking disputes between judges and the military.2 2 7 Justice Scalia
decried the majority's holding that federal courts have habeas jurisdiction whenever they can reach a "custodian" (as contrasted with the
prisoner himself) as a "breathtaking" assertion ofjurisdiction through22
out the world.
3.

Rumsfeld v,Padilla

Padilla, an American citizen, was apprehended pursuant to a warrant issued by a U.S. District Court in New York in connection with a
grand jury investigation into September 1 1 .229 While Padilla's motion
to vacate this warrant was pending, President Bush designated him an
"enemy combatant" and ordered Secretary of Defense Donald
Braden v. 30thJudicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), which permitted a federal
district court to review a petition filed by a prisoner outside its territorial jurisdiction
(he was being held by another district court) so long as its process could reach his
custodian. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95). Justice
Kennedy disputed the idea that Braden had overturned Eisentrager,and instead found
that the district court had jurisdiction under the Eisentrager framework. See id. at
485-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens expressed no opinion about what proceedings would be necessary. Id.
226 See id. at 488-506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 499 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950)). He
pointed out that Braden applied not to foreigners outside of America, but rather to
citizens in custody in multiple jurisdictions within the United States who wished to
challenge the legality of their confinement. See id. at 493-97.
228 Id. at 498. "For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war,
and in frustration of our military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law,
is judicial adventurism of the worst sort." Id. at 506. Justice Scalia also emphasized
that the Court's focus on the location of the custodians (not the prisoners) made
irrelevant its elaborate treatment of the status of Guantanamo Bay, where the prisoners had been detained. Id. at 500.
229 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004).
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237 See supra note 9 and accompanying
235
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detained indefinitely as an "enemy combatant." 23 8 Indeed, Rasul
shows how far the Court was willing to distort the statute to ensure
that even noncitizens outside of the United States could file habeas
petitions-a conclusion that contradicted Eisentrager,as even Bush's
most vocal opponents concede. 2 39 Furthermore, Hamdi is a very rare
case in which the Court struck down a war policy that enjoyed the
240
support of both political branches.
Nonetheless, the Court hardly handed the President a total
defeat, as many scholars claimed. 2 41 On the contrary, it repeatedly
acknowledged the government's vital interest in conducting war effec238 Padilla is not to the contrary because the prisoner could still obtain habeas
relief in another federal district court. See Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 939, 971-81, 1000-06 (2003) (arguing that
meaningful habeas review should be available to American citizens-especially those
like Padilla who have been captured and are being detained in America during a time
when the nation has not mobilized totally for war-but not to aliens, particularly
those apprehended and imprisoned outside the United States like Rasul).
239 For example, Professor Katyal, who has taken a leading role in both litigating
and commenting upon the enemy combatant cases, admitted that Eisentrager was
directly on point in precluding habeas relief for the alien detainees in RasuL See
Katyal, supra note 138, at 1254-55. Rather, he argued that Eisentragershould not be
treated as binding precedent today because of the intervening transformation of both
the legal landscape (e.g., the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) in 1951, the United States' adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1955, and
the Warren Court's due process revolution) and the nature of war (especially the
stateless and perhaps perpetual War on Terrorism). See id. at 1238-39, 1251-56. Similarly, Professor Cole declared that Rasul indicated the Court "may be ready to question some of its earlier precedents" and that '[t]he Guantanamo litigants prevailed
not because of the strength of their legal arguments in court-the majority's statutory
construction argument is more than a little strained, as Justice Scalia amply illustrates
in his dissent-but because Guantanamo had become an international embarrassment to the United States." David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 627, 651, 653 (2006). Congress swiftly
overturned Rasu!'s implausible statutory interpretation as to the Guantanamo detainees. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. But see James E. Pfander, The Limits of
HabeasJurisdictionand the Global War on Terror,91 CORNELL L. REv. 497 (2006) (maintaining that the majority in Rasul correctly concluded that federal courts can review
the legality of detention by the American military overseas, but that such jurisdiction
rests not on the habeas statute but rather on the availability of declaratory and injunctive relief under the general federal question jurisdiction statute).
240 Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (cautioning that congressional authorization of a President's
action creates an extremely strong presumption of constitutionality).
241 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; cf Sunstein, supra note 22, at 93-103
(contending that the Court properly issued narrow rulings that merely sustained
federal court jurisdiction to require fair hearings for detainees, but left the details of
such hearings to the political process).

1056

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

82:3

tively and with minimal judicial disruption. Accordingly, the Court
reaffirmed the political branches' superior expertise over national
security matters, the general wisdom of deference to executive judgments, the government's need to protect military and foreign intelligence, the President's power to detain enemy combatants (even
citizens) for the duration of a war, the minimal nature of due process
requirements (e.g., allowing hearsay and trial by properly authorized
military tribunals), and the rule against directing habeas writs to highlevel federal officials. Moreover, the Court highlighted the tentative
nature of its ruling by acknowledging that its "understanding may
unravel" in the future if "the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the devel24 2
opment of the law of war."

In short, these three cases did not necessarily signal a major shift
in the Court's jurisprudence in which individual liberties will be
upheld vigorously against executive claims of national security.
Rather, they appear to reflect the established pattern of making complex, discretionary legal and political determinations based on several
factors.
First, the emergency of September 2001 had dissipated, and the
President's indefinite (perhaps permanent) detention of alleged
enemy combatants without charges, access to counsel, or hearings
struck most Justices as extreme measures in fighting the War on Terrorism.2

43

Moreover, widespread condemnation of the United States'

treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and the abuse of prisoners
at Abu Ghraib (shocking photos of which were published while the
cases were pending) undoubtedly made the Court skeptical of the
242 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). See generally
Nicholas G. Green, Note, A "Blank Check": JudicialReview and the War Powers in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 56 S.C. L. REV. 581 (2005) (positing that the Court's rhetorical assertion
of broad review power contrasted with the practical effect of its decision, which was to
show great deference to the political branches' exercise of war powers within certain
outer limits); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 573 (2006) (concluding
that the Court correctly acknowledged the government's wide discretion in fighting
the War on Terrorism, but unwisely directed federal judges to assess the cases of
detainees, which will require judges to make factual and legal judgments about
national security that fall outside the scope of their individual and institutional
competence).
243 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2123-24; see also Lobel, supra note
8, at 769-90 (suggesting that continued judicial deference to the President could lead
to a dangerous governmental system in an era of perpetual warfare and permanent
emergency, especially given that the War on Terrorism is of indefinite durationunlike the nineteenth- and twentieth-century wars that bred the deferential
approach).
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administration's claim that it could be trusted to conduct the War on
2 44
Terrorism free from judicial (and even congressional) oversight.
Second, the legal rights at stake were hallowed. The government
had attempted to deny the applicability of the ancient writ of habeas
corpus to vindicate the most basic constitutional liberty -freedom
2 45
from unlawful confinement.
Third, President Bush, who squeaked into office in a bitterly contested election in 2000246 and whose public approval ratings in 2004
hovered below fifty percent, 2 47 did not have the political strength or

personal inclination to defy the Court's orders.
For the majority of Justices, all of the foregoing considerations
apparently outweighed their countervailing judgment that Congress
in the AUMF had authorized the President to detain enemy combatants, even though such legislative-executive agreement in the past has
clinched the validity of the government's action. 248 The Court's statutory interpretation in Hamdi is sound, although the opposite conclusion is at least plausible. Indeed, Justice Souter's concurrence
represents the more typical method of construing a general statute
(the AUMF) as not authorizing a specific executive action (detention), thereby avoiding constitutional questions. 2 49 Under either the
O'Connor or Souter approach, however, the upshot is that the President lost. Such result-oriented decisionmaking also characterizes
244 See Cole, supra note 239, at 653. Bush had argued that the President has independent Article II power to incarcerate enemy combatants, even without congressional authorization. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-17. In Bush's defense, the
President does have a special duty to protect American troops, and it is therefore
troubling that "a number of detainees ... have reappeared on the battlefield against
the United States." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2125.
245 The Court accorded the Great Writ special treatment even during World War
1I, despite its overall tolerance of massive infringements of constitutional rights.
Immediately after issuing its infamous Korematsu decision, the Court granted the
habeas petition of a Japanese-American who had been imprisoned even though the
government had not disputed her loyalty. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294,
305-07 (1944), discussed supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
246 See RobertJ. Pushaw,Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative
Mirror,18 CONST. ComMENT. 359, 382-90 (2001) (describing the election dispute and
the litigation it spawned).
247 See USA Today, Campaign 2004: USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/polls/usatodaypolls.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007); see aLso Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 278 (contrasting Bush's narrow win and lack of broad-based support with FDR's landslide victories and widespread popularity).
248 See, e.g., supra notes 74, 105-06, 109, 128-29, 136, 141,161, 168-69 and accompanying text.
249 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 93-96.
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that Congress intended fedRasul, which rests on the dubious notion
instituted by foreign enemies
eral courts to entertain habeas actions
United States.
captured and imprisoned outside the
different, however, I suspect
been
had
If the facts on the ground
as well. For instance, if Septemthe results would have been different
terrorist attacks, with attendant
ber 11 had been followed by more
to use all means necessary to propublic pressure on the government
enjoying overwhelming poputect Americans and with President Bush
have adopted such an expansive
lar support, I doubt the Court would
Of course, we can only hope
view of habeas corpus and due process.
never comes to pass, and that
(perhaps naively) that such a situation
will never be tested.
therefore my hypothetical counterexample
Hramdan v. Rumsfeld
B. The Legality of Military Commissions:
Bush invoked his authority
On November 13, 2001, George
to order that any noncitizen
under the AUMF and the Constitution
was an al Qaeda member or
whom the President reasonably believed
must be tried by a military comhad participated in terrorist activities
25 0 In July 2003, the
of Defense.
mission appointed by the Secretary
such a trial Salim Hamdan, a
Bush Administration designated for
in Afghanistan in November
Yemeni national who had been captured
In July

Bay in June 2002.251
2001 and transported to Guantanamo
conspiracy to commit acts of terror-

2004, Hamdan was charged with
bodyguard and driver from
ism--specifically, serving as bin Laden's
terrorist attacks,
1996-2001, accompanying him as he encouraged
weapons trainreceiving
and
transporting weapons used by al Qaeda,

Review Tribunal found Hamdan's
ing. 252 Thereafter, a Combat Status
an "enemy

to be justified because he was
continued ''detention
253
combatant.

court granted Hamdan a
In November 2004, a federal district
that the President's military comwrit of habeas corpus on the ground
of the Uniform Code of Milmission had been established in violation
s 2 4
Convention . 5 The U.S. Court
itary Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva
in an opinion joined by thenof Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed,
Conventions were not judiJudge Roberts holding that the Geneva
Trial of
13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and
250 See Military Order of November
in
reprinted
Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001),
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
2749, 2759-60 (2006).
251 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
252 Id. at 2760-61.
253 Id. at 2761.
the Geneva
court opinion and provisions from
254 Id. at 2761-62 (citing district
Conventions).
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cially enforceable, that Quirin foreclosed constitutional objections to
military tribunals, and that Hamdan's trial would not violate the
UCMJ.2 55
After the Supreme Court accepted Hamdan's petition for review,
Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) .256 Section 1005(e) (1) overturned Rasul by providing that "no court, justice,
or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. '25 7 Section

1005(h) (1) made this provision "effect[ive] on the date of the enactment of this Act [December 30, 2005] ."258 The government moved to
dismiss on the ground that the DTA deprived the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction.

25

9

Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined in full by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer and in part by Justice Kennedy, ruled that the
Court had jurisdiction, that Congress had not authorized these military commissions, and that their structure and procedures violated the
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. 260 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito vigorously dissented.2 6 ' For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to
examine the jurisdictional and merits holdings (and corresponding
dissents) separately.
1. Jurisdictional Issues
a.

Statutory Repeal of Appellate Jurisdiction

The government contended that the DTA made plain that "no
court" (including the Supreme Court) had jurisdiction to consider
habeas petitions by Guantanamo Bay detainees, effective December
255 Id. at 2762 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38, 42-43 (2005)).
256 Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739-44 (2005) (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C., including titles 10, 28, and 42).
257 Id. § 1005(e) (1), 119 Stat. at 2741-42 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West
Supp. 2006)). The Court in Rasul had creatively construed the general habeas corpus
statute as extending to aliens at Guantanamo. See supra Part 1I1.A.2. As to such petitioners outside of Guantanamo, however, Rasul remained in force until the passage of
the Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, § 950j (b) (Oct. 17,
2006).
258 Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(h)(1), 119 Stat. at 2743 (codified at 10
U.S.C.A. § 801 note (West Supp. 2006)).
259 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct at 2762.
260 See id. at 2762-98.
261 See id. at 2810-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2849-55 (Alito, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts did not participate
because the D.C. Circuit decision he had joined was being reviewed.
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30, 2005.262 This argument, accepted by the dissenters, rested on long

and unbroken precedent, which established two principles.2 6 1 First,
Article III grants Congress plenary power to make "exceptions" to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 264 Second, a federal law ousting jurisdiction applies to pending cases, except when the statute
265
explicitly reserves such jurisdiction.
The majority characterized this precedent as setting forth not an
ironclad rule, but merely a "presumption against jurisdiction. ' 266
This presumption could be rebutted by ordinary principles of statutory construction--here, that "a negative inference may be drawn
from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is
included in other provisions of the same statute." 26 7 Applying this
interpretive canon to the DTA, Justice Stevens observed that section
1105(h)(2) expressly made sections 1005(e)(2) and (e) (3) -which
grant the D.C. Circuit "exclusive jurisdiction" to review the "final decisions" of Combat Status Review Tribunals and military commissions applicable to pending cases, whereas section 1005(h) (1) contained no
such explicit termination of pending claims as to section
1005(e)(1). 2

68

Hence, the majority held that Congress had not

262 Id. at 2762-63 (majority opinion).
263 See id. at 2810-18 (Scalia, J,, dissenting, joined by Thomas and Alito,JJ.),
264 Id. at 2819 (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)). In
light of this long-recognized constitutional power, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's suggestion that its interpretation was preferable because it avoided "'grave questions about Congress' authority to impinge upon this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
particularly in habeas cases.'" Id. (citing majority opinion).
265 Id. at 2810-12 (supporting this proposition with citations to a dozen Supreme
Court cases dating back to 1809).
266 Id. at 2764 (majority opinion).
267 Id. at 2765.
268 Id. at 2765-66 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). Lindh
concerned two revisions in 1996 to the federal habeas statute: Chapter 153 amended
the scope of collateral review by federal courts in noncapital cases, while Chapter 154
was added to address state capital cases. Chapter 154 explicitly applied to pending
cases, so the Court negatively inferred that Chapter 153 (which contained no such
provision) did not. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326-30. Justice Stevens interpreted the DTA
the same way. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2766.
By contrast, the dissenters emphasized that both statutory chapters in Lindh had
effects that were not merely procedural but also substantive. Because substantive laws
are presumed not to apply retroactively, Congress understood that it had to state
explicitly if a chapter would apply to pending cases. See id. at 2813-14 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327). In that situation, Chapter 153's absence of
such a statement justified the inference that it would not reach pending cases. Id. at
2813-14. Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that sections 1005(e) (2) and (3) conferred
new jurisdiction on federal courts (granting the D.C. Circuit exclusive review), and
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In response, Justice Scalia pointed out that Councilman's first factor also weighed "military necessities" and "exigencies," and he reasoned that "[i]f 'military necessities' relating to 'duty' and 'discipline'
[in a marijuana case] required abstention in Councilman, military
necessities relating to the disabling, deterrence, and punishment of
the mass-murdering terrorists of September 11 require abstention all
the more here."2 75 As for the second criterion, he noted that Congress in the DTA had established a system allowing for military commissions and authorizing federal appellate review. 276 Justice Scalia

warned that ignoring the DTA's process "br[ought] the Judicial
Branch into direct conflict with the Executive in an area where the
Executive's competence is maximal and ours is virtually nonexistent.
We should exercise our equitable discretion to avoid such conflict.
2 77
Instead, the Court rushes headlong to meet it."

c.

Analyzing the Court's Jurisdictional Ruling

The majority's jurisdictional conclusions are debatable. First, as
Justice Scalia emphasized, "the Court. . . cannot cite a single case in
the history of Anglo-American law (before today) in which a jurisdiction-stripping provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases,
absent an explicit statutory reservation."' 278 Second, under Councilman
gress in the DTA had created a system of Article III review of military commissions
that did not exist in 1942. Id. at 2822 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 2821 (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757).
276 Id. at 2821-22.
277 Id. at 2822.
278 Id. at 2812 (emphasis omitted). Even David Cole, perhaps the most ardent
legal critic of the War on Terrorism, deemed it "remarkable" that "the Court decided
the case at all in the face of Congress' efforts to strip the Court ofjurisdiction." Cole,
supranote 9. Similarly, Martin Flaherty conceded that the Republican Congress likely
intended the DTA to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction in Hamdan, but applauded the
Court for exploiting an "ambiguity" in the DTA's text to assert power. Flaherty, supra'
note 9, at 58.
My criticism of the Court for brushing aside a century and a half of case law does
not mean I agree with that precedent. Rather, I reject the conventional wisdom that
Congress can remove the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over a federal question "case" and not assign that case to a lower federal court, thereby leaving final
decisionmaking power in state tribunals. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal CourtJurisdiction:A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of
Article III, 1997 BYU L. REv. 847, 848-97 (developing the thesis that Congress must
vest judicial power over all federal law cases in a federal forum). Under my approach,
however, the DTA is valid because Congress merely reallocated jurisdiction over a
federal question case from one Article III court (the Supreme Court) to another (the
D.C. Circuit), not to a state tribunal.
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279
abstention would have been justified.
Thus, the Court's decision to assert jurisdiction likely reflected
considerations unrelated to the straightforward application of the
legal principles set forth in previous cases. From a practical standpoint, declining jurisdiction (or abstaining) might have cost the
majority a golden opportunity to affirm the authority of both the judiciary and Congress to limit the President's exercise of war powers. 2 0
Of course, it is hardly novel for the Court to manipulate jurisdictional doctrines in the military context. Almost invariably, however,
the Justices have imaginatively interpreted jurisdictional statutes or

279 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2820-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because abstention is
based upon equitable discretion rather than black-letter rules, the only fair criticism
of the Court is that it has exercised such discretion unwisely, not unlawfully. In
Hamdan, the Court could have obviated the need to decide several legal issues (and
perhaps the entire case) by waiting until after the military commission rendered its
decision and the D.C. Circuit conducted its review. Once again, my doubts about the
Court's application of its abstention doctrines should not be taken as signifying my
acceptance of their legal validity. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement
Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory that Self-Restraint
Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1289, 1300-05, 1338-39 (2005) (contending that allowing federal judges to abstain from deciding federal law cases violates
their Article III duty to exercise all federal question jurisdiction conferred by Congress); Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 38, at 398-99 (recognizing limited constitutional exceptions allowing courts to decline jurisdiction to avoid rendering advisory
opinions, decisions on political questions, or judgments that can be revised by the
elected branches).
280 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 99-103 (arguing that the Court defied Congress's
command to refrain from exercising jurisdiction and ignored venerable precedent in
order to reach its desired result of blocking the military commissions). Had the
Court not taken jurisdiction, Hamdan would have been tried by the military commission and appealed any adverse rulings to the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court-a
process likely to consume several years. By that time, one (or more) of the Justices in
the majority might have been replaced by jurists more sympathetic to strong executive
power. Chief Justice Roberts (as a circuit judge) and Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas all supported the President's authority to establish military commissions, and
so the addition of a similar-minded Justice would have led to a different result. Now
that Hamdan has been decided, however, a new conservative Justice dedicated to stare
decisis might reaffirm that case even if he or she thought it was wrongly decided as an
original matter. Of course, the Court in the future might overrule or distinguish
Hamdan, but doing so might exact political and institutional costs.
Moreover, even if the Court's composition remained the same, perhaps the new
President who assumes office in 2008 will be more willing to challenge the Court
because he or she will be more popular than Bush, whose approval rating had sunk to
a historic low of thirty-one percent in May 2006. Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee,
Poll Gives Bush His Worst Marks Yet On Major Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006, at Al.
Conversely, the new President might adopt less aggressive policies regarding enemy
combatants, thereby mooting the legal issues.
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invoked doctrines like justiciability and abstention to avoid reaching a
decision on the merits. To take the most familiar example, the President's wartime actions have often been deemed unreviewable political
questions.28 1 Hamdan presents the exceedingly rare situation in
which the Court distorted its jurisdictional precedent to reach a controversial legal issue. Examination of its decision on the merits reveals
that the Court similarly disregarded its entrenched case law.
2.

The Legality of Military Commissions

The majority ruled that Congress had not expressly authorized
Hamdan's commission28 2 and that its structure and procedures violated the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. 283 These two holdings-and the stinging dissents they prompted-will be examined in
turn.
a.

Congressional Authorization

Justice Stevens initially noted that the Court had never had occasion to define precisely the scope of the President's implicit constitutional power to convene military tribunals. 28 4 Most importantly, in
Quirin the Court ducked this question because it concluded that Congress, through Article of War 15, had authorized the use of military
commissions to try offenses against the law of war. 28 5 The majority
observed that Article 15 had been incorporated into Article 21 of the
UCMJ, which provides that the "'Ulurisdiction of courts-martial ...
shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . .of con281

See supra notes 67-77, 83, 100-04, 107, 124-25, 154-63 and accompanying

text.

282 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-75; id. at 2799-2800, 2808 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
283 See id. at 2786-98. Justice Kennedy agreed that Hamdan's commission was
unauthorized and that its structure and procedures were invalid. See id. at 2799-808.
Therefore, he found it unnecessary to decide whether the law of war included

conspiracy or whether Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions required that
the accused be present at all stages of a trial. Id. at 2809. However, Justice Stevens
and three colleagues reached these two questions. See id. at 2775-86 (plurality opinion) (determining that the law of war did not recognize conspiracy and that Common
Article 3 guaranteed the right to be continuously present at trial). But see id. at
2826-38, 2846-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting these conclusions).
284 See id. at 2774 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2772-74 (explaining that military commissions had arisen in the nineteenth century out of necessity-to enable
commanders to try cases that did not fall within the jurisdiction of courts-martial,
which at that time was very limited).
285 See id. at 2774 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)); see also id. at 2802
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (similarly interpreting Quirin).
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ity]," but concluded that Congress had responded to criticism of this
decision by expanding the category of persons entitled to UCMJ protection to those in the position of Yamashita (and Hamdan).9 8
Justice Thomas responded that cases like Quirin, Yamashita, and
Madsen had construed the predecessor of Article 36(b) as recognizing
the President's longstanding power to establish military commissions
and prescribe their procedures. 299 Thomas denied that later amendments to the UCMJ had limited executive authority; on the contrary,
Article 36 had reaffirmed the President's discretion to create commissions that departed from ordinary procedures when he determined
that uniformity would be impracticable.3 0 0 Moreover, Justice Thomas
contended that, even if the majority's reading of Article 36(b) were
correct, President Bush had determined that it was impracticable to
use court-martial rules because the War on Terrorism posed unique
dangers to national security. 30
ii.

The Geneva Conventions

The Court further ruled that the military commission's procedures ran afoul of the Geneva Conventions.3 0 2 Initially, Justice Stevens found that the Conventions were judicially enforceable because
UCMJ Article 21 required compliance with the law of war (which
included those Conventions). 30 3 In particular, Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions gave all prisoners captured in a conflict in
ordinary courts-martial: the right to be present. Id. at 2792 (majority opinion) (citing
10 U.S.C.A. § 839(c) (West Supp. 2006)).
298 Id. at 2788-89; see also id. at 2803-04, 2807-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (likewise stressing the limited relevance of World War II cases decided before Congress
had enacted its current legal regime regarding courts-martial).
299 Id. at 2840-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 2839-40; see also id. at 2842 (claiming that UCMJ Article 36 sought to
ensure uniform procedures across the branches of the armed forces, not between
courts-martial and military commissions).

301 Id. at 2842-43 (citing statements of executive branch officials).
302 See id. at 2793-96 (majority opinion); id. at 2799, 2802-04, 2807-08 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
303 Id. at 2793-94 (majority opinion). In Stevens's view, Article 21 controlled
because it had been passed after the Court's decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S.
763 (1950), which contained a footnote stating that the Conventions were enforceable only by political and military (not judicial) authorities. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794
(citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 789 n.14); see also id. at 2802-03 (Kennedy, J.,concurring) (contending that Article 21 had sapped Eisentragerof precedential force). But
see id. at 2844-46 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (asserting that nothing in Article 21 altered
Eisentrager'scorrect holding that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable, and that in any event Common Article 3 covered only military tribunals, whereas
UCMJ Article 21 concerned the different issue of whether an "offender" or "offense"
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the territory of a signatory party (such as Afghanistan) the right to "'a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees .. .
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'' 0 4 The majority
defined "a regularly constituted court" to mean a nation's preestablished ordinary military courts, which in the United States were the
courts-martial created by Congress.3 0 5 Hence, a military commission
could not possibly be "regularly constituted" absent a demonstrated
30 6
practical need to depart from court-martial practice.
By contrast, the dissenters argued that Hamdan's military commission was a "regularly constituted court" because (1) it had been
established pursuant to UCMJ Article 21 (which preserved the President's power to convene such commissions), and (2) such tribunals
had long been recognized as valid for trials of enemy combatants
accused of war crimes. 0 7 Moreover, Justice Thomas emphasized that
the commission afforded all the indispensable judicial guarantees
(e.g., the right to counsel and the "reasonable doubt" standard),
except for access to proceedings and evidence that would compromise
national security-and even then, denials of such access would be
judicially reviewable to ensure a fair trial.30 8

was suitable for a military trial (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.

§821 (2000)).
304

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 (majority opinion).

305

Id. at 2796-97; see also id. at 2799-800, 2802-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

306 Id. at 2796-97 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2799-800, 2802-08 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). The plurality further concluded that the military commission convened to uy Hamdan violated Common Article 3 because it denied the accused the
right to be present and to be privy to inculpatory evidence. Id. at 2798 (plurality
opinion) (citing DOD Order, supra note 293, §§ 6(B) (3), (D)); see also id. at 2785-86
(declaring that military necessity did not justify the President's resort to a military
commission rather than a court-martial). Justice Thomas replied that the executive
had preserved these rights to the extent feasible and had created an exception only
where necessary to protect national security and classified information, and had
retained judicial review to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 2847-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also id.at 2846-47 (suggesting that Hamdan's claims under Common Article 3
would not become ripe unless and until the military commission convicted and sentenced him). Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to decide whether Common Article 3 conferred a right to be present at all stages of a trial and to have access to all
evidence. Id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
307

See id. at 2847 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2850-53 (Alito, J., dissenting).

308 See id. at 2848-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2850-53 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that any procedural or evidentiary problems could be remedied through judicial review, not by declaring the military commission itself
illegitimate).
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National Security and the Rule of Law

c.

that the Constitution's
Ultimately, Justice Thomas concluded
as well as various federal stattext, structure, history, and precedent,
to President Bush's decision to
utes, all dictated judicial deference
30 9 Moretry an enemy combatant.
to
commission
military
a
create
disregard of well-settled law was
over, he asserted that the majority's

singularly dangerous:

battle with a nation-state, but
We are not engaged in a traditional
who lurks in the shadows
with a worldwide, hydra-headed enemy,
of September 11, 2001, and
conspiring to reproduce the atrocities
bombers into civilian gatherwho has boasted of sending suicide
of beheadings of civilian
ings, has proudly distributed videotapes
captured American
workers, and has tortured and dismembered
President's
hamper[s] the 310
soldiers.... [The Court's holding] sorely
enemy.
deadly
and
new
a
ability to confront and defeat
might be a dangerous
The majority acknowledged that Hamdan
kill innocent civilians, but noted
individual who wished to hurt and
power to detain
that he "[did] not challenge

. . .

the Government's

in order to prevent such
him for the duration of active hostilities
maintained that, if the executive
1
harm."31 Nonetheless, the Court
it had to comply with the
branch sought5 2to try Hamdan criminally,those concerns in his brief
"rule of law." 3 Justice Breyer echoed
concurrence:

upon a single ground: ConThe Court's conclusion ultimately rests
"blank check." Indeed, Congress has not issued the Executive a
legislative authority to create
gress has denied the President the
here. Nothing prevents the
military commissions of the kind at issue
to seek the authority he
President from returning to Congress
believes necessary.
with Congress,
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultationnot weaken our
does
judicial insistence upon that consultation
To the contrary, that insistence
Nation's ability to deal with danger.
-through democratic
determine
strengthens the Nation's ability to

See id. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
"has
(warning that the majority's approach
310 Id. at 2838; see also id. at 2830
Comas
ability to discharge his duties
dangerous implications for the Executive's
the Court's "willingness to second-guess
that
(claiming
mander in Chief"); id. at 2839
and
branches" was "both unprecedented
the determination of the political
dangerous").
concurring)
see also id. at 2804-05 (Kennedy, J.,
311 Id. at 2798 (majority opinion);
right
government's
the
against Hamdan and
(recognizing the gravity of the charges
to imprison him).
312 Id. at 2798 (majority opinion).

309
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means-how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in
3 13
those democratic means. Our Court today simply does the same.
3.

A Critique of Hamdan

Despite the pledges of fealty to the rule of law by Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Kennedy, Hamdan illustrates that law has little to do with
judicial review of war powers. Of course, the majority cited cases in
which the Court had checked the President's attempts to claim sweeping authority, like Milligan and Youngstown, but they concerned
domestic decisions affecting the rights of American citizens. In the
precedent directly on point (Quirin and Yamashita), the Court confirmed the President's power to try alien enemy combatants by his
own military tribunals, refused to question his judgment that these
organs were necessary for national security, and declined to review
their procedures. 3 14 Indeed, even Hamdan's own lawyer, Georgetown
31 5
Law Professor Neal Katyal, conceded as much in a 2004 essay.
It is possible that Quiin and Yamashita were wrongly decided.
Perhaps, too, our most revered Presidents-Washington, Lincoln, and
Roosevelt-illegally created military commissions. And maybe Congress has erred in consistently recognizing the validity of such executive power. If the Court in Hamdan had come to these weighty
conclusions, it should have struck down this federal legislation as
unconstitutional and overruled its incorrect decisions. Instead, the
majority purported to apply its precedent and the applicable statutes,
but stretched them beyond reasonable bounds in three key rulings.
First, the plurality and two concurring opinions cited the lack of
congressional authorization for military commissions as dispositive.3 1 6
313

Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).

314

See Yoo, supra note 14, at 91-93, 103-06; see also id. at 93-94 (explaining that

the Bush military commissions featured many more procedural and evidentiary protections than those upheld in Quifin and Yamashita).
315 See Katyal, supra note 138, at 1253-54 (admitting that Quinin supported the
validity of military commissions to try alien "enemy combatants," but arguing that
Quirin should be treated as a "lapsed precedent" because it involved strikingly differ-

ent factual and legal circumstances than the War on Terrorism); see also Katyal &
Tribe, supra note 8, at 1284-85 (to similar effect). I disagree with this attempt to
distinguish Quirin, for reasons set forth infra note 317.
316 See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text; see also Flaherty, supranote 9, at
53-62 (praising the Court for insisting on Congress's focused involvement, including

a requirement that Congress must clearly approve military tribunals and other war
measures); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1259-77, 1298-311 (arguing in 2002 that
President Bush's unilateral creation of military commissions violated the Constitution
because he had failed to obtain specific legislative authorization and no emergency

justified bypassing Congress).
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This conclusion conflicts with the most likely meaning of several statutes. Most significantly, in 1950 Congress effectively codified Quiin's
holding that Article 15 authorized the President to establish military
tribunals by adopting Article 15's language verbatim in Article 21 of
the UCMJ.3 1 7 No later statute has altered this executive power, and

post-September 11 legislation has reinforced it and triggered its exercise. For example, the AUMF directed the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" 318s against the terrorists, and such force
has always been understood to include detaining enemy combatants
31 9
for the war's duration and trying them by military commission.
317 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 274-75; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2130 (citing supporting legislative history). An eminent
scholar, writing shortly after the UCMJ had been enacted and hence unbiased by
subsequent events, concluded that Article 21 acknowledged the President's longstanding and exclusive Article II power to create military commissions and to determine their powers and procedures. See RoSSITER, supra note 84, at 102-03, 109; see
also supra notes 90, 110-14, 136 and accompanying text (describing the history of
military tribunals established without congressional authorization). Disregarding this
history and case law, the Court ruled that Article 21 does not sanction military commissions. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
Professors Katyal and Tribe have claimed that Quirin should be discounted as
precedent in interpreting Article 15 because the Court rendered its judgment hastily,
under extreme political pressure, and in the midst of a total war waged pursuant to
Congress's declaration of war and its authorization of military commissions. Katyal &
Tribe, supra note 8, at 1284-91. That argument is refuted by Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 341 (1952), discussed supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. The Court
decided Madsen long after World War II had ended and under no pressures of time
or governmental strong-arming. It expressly reaffirmed Quirin's holding that "'[bjy
the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far
as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases."' Madsen, 343 U.S.
at 355 n.22 (quoting ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)); see also id. at 352 ("Article
15 ... states unequivocally that Congress has not deprived such commissions or tribunals of the[ir] existing jurisdiction .

. . ."

(citing In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946);

Quiin, 317 U.S. 1)); id. at 355 (citing Yamashita as approving Quiin's interpretation
of Article 15). Finally, the Court in Madsen noted that Congress had recently reenacted Article 15 as Article 21 of the new UCMJ to preserve the existing practice
regarding military tribunals. Id. at 315 n.17. Thus, it is clear that Quinn is still alive
and well.
318 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. 11 2003)).
319 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2127-33 (citing history); see also
Paulsen, supra note 59, at 252, 256-57 (contending that the AUMF contained arguably the broadest delegation of war powers ever to a President, and certainly authorized the creation of military commissions). Nonetheless, two distinguished scholars
have maintained that, although imprisoning unlawful combatants is part of the President's power as Commander in Chief to wage war successfully, military commissions
fall into the different realm of adjudicating and punishing alleged violations of law.
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AUMF
why the Court found that the
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most consistent, legal interpretation
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both powers (Justice Thomas's
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Congress authorized military comview) .320 Any doubt about whether
by
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missions in the AUMF or UCMJ
321 Congress must
Treatment Act.
Section 1005(e) (3) of the Detainee
legally formed the military commishave thought President Bush had
them rather than providing for
sions, or else it would have repudiated
3 22
judgments.
an appeal from their
of statutory provisions that
The Court's strict construction
and
President (the AUMF, UCMJ,
seemed to confer power on the
sections
of
its loose interpretation
DTA) contrasts sharply with
juriswhich appeared to deprive it of
1005(e) (1) and (h) of the DTA,
were
Justices' suggestion that they
diction. Therefore, the majority
authorization for government
modestly trying to ensure congressionalbranch, not the judiciary. 3 23
the executive
action is true only as to
that Bush's military commissions
Second, the Court concluded
proby unjustifiably employing different
violated UCMJ Article 36(b) 324
legisHowever, Article 36's language,
cedures than courts-martial.
simply
it
that
norms all indicate
lative history, and background
long-established authority to prescribe
acknowledged the President's
-and to diverge from court-marprocedures for military commissions
a certain logic
1270. Although that distinction has
See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at
determination
has always accepted the President's
in theory, in practice the Court
war.
aspect of prosecuting
that trials by military tribunal are one
v.
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Hamdi
2823-25
at
Ct.
S.
126
320 See Hamdan,
supra
Yoo,
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579-98 (2004)
Thomas's analysis). Justices Souter
note 14, at 97, 99-100, 109-10 (supportingjustice (albeit a disdain for precedent) in
consistency
and Ginsburg also showed intellectual
neither
position: that the AUMF authorized
Thomas's
of
articulating the converse
provisions.
because of countervailing statutory
this
detention nor military commissions
and accompanying text (summarizing
the
See supra notes 205-07, 259, 282-88
that
arguing
by
logic
demonstrated internal
approach). Finally,Justice Scalia also
(such
citizen
States
United
any
commission
President cannot detain or try by military
See supra
against noncitizens (like Hamdan).
actions
such
take
can
but
as Hamdi),
perspective).
Scalia's
text (describing justice
notes 207-13, 226-29 and accompanying
at
119 Stat. 2739, 2741-42 (2005) (codified
1005(e)(3),
§
321 Pub. L. No. 109-148,
2006)).
10 U.S.C.A. § 801 note (West Supp.
97.
at
14,
note
supra
322 SeeYoo,
REV., at
and Law, Again, 2006 CATO Sup. CT.
323 See Roger Pilon, Foreword: Politics
to limit
power
its
of
ignored Congress's exercise
vii, xiii (asserting that the majority
Congress's
enhance
to
purporting
the Court's jurisdiction while simultaneously
authority).
324 See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2790-92.
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that following them would be
tial procedures32 5when he determined
impracticable .
Article 21's reference to the
Third, the Court held that UCMJ
Article 3 of the Geneva Conven"law of war" incorporated Common
interpretation of the Contions -and implicitly overruled EisentrageS
3 26 Here the Court made, in
'
ventions as unenforceable judicially.
of simple chronology. "327
mistake
"glaring
a
Professor Yoo's words,
overturned Eisentrager,which was
The UCMJ could not possibly have
328 Similarly, Congress
enactment.
decided a month after the UCMJ's
Common Article 3 of the
could not have intended to incorporate
1955-into the UCMJ, which was
Geneva Conventions -ratified in
passed in 1950.329
of every major issue was
In sum, the Hamdan Court's analysis
conclusion cannot be dismissed
implausible under existing law. This
conservative Republicans like
as merely the opinion of disappointed
Cole, the most
Yoo. Rather, even David
a
Justice Thomas and John
of the War on Terrorism and
acidic and prolific academic critic
the
decision, acknowledged that
staunch supporter of the Court's
majority had disregarded its precedent:
battle is a gross understateTo say that Hamdan faced an uphill
in the past that foreign nationment. The Supreme Court has said
like Hanidan, lack any
als who are outside U.S. borders,
was a member of the enemy
constitutional protections. Hamdan
courts are especially reluctant to
forces when he was captured, and
of "enemy aliens" in wartime.
interfere with the military's treatment
generally prefer to wait until
He filed his suit before trial, and courts
its legality. And as recently as
a trial is completed before assessing
upheld the use of military tribuWorld War II, the Supreme Court
are not enforceable by
nals, and ruled that the Geneva Conventions

supra note
J., dissenting); Bradley & Goldsmith,
325 See id. at 2839-43 (Thomas,
6
support for Justice Thomas's argument).
23, at 2130 n.36 (providing further
supranote
(majority opinion); see also Katyal,
trials
326 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-96
military
that
insisted
that the Court correctly
9, at 71, 98, 110-12 (contending
Geneva
the
with
comply
and
of military justice
must have the essential elements
Conventions).
109.
327 See Yoo, supra note 14, at
specifically,
this chronology). Justice Stevens
328 See id. at 108-09 (setting forth
Eisentrager
Court's
the
after
passed
21 had been
and wrongly, asserted that Article
2794.
One
decision. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
107-09 (compiling relevant documentation).
at
14,
note
supra
Yoo,
See
329
system
legal
evolving
an
to
war" phrase refers
might argue that the UCMJ's "law of
presented
to that law. However, the Court
changes
later
all
and hence encompasses
contemplated
contained in the Geneva Conventions
to the
no evidence that the "law of war"
or that Congress intended, contrary
judicial rather than political enforcement
sources).
(citing
107-08
at
id.
court forum. See
Conventions, to provide a federal
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only through diploindividuals in U.S. courts but may be enforced
matic means.
face enough hurdles, after the
.. . And as if Hamdan did not
Congress passed a law [the
Supreme Court agreed to hear his case,
to strip the Supreme Court of
DTA] that appeared to be designed
its jurisdiction to hear the case.
the case at all in the face of
.... The fact that the Court decided
of jurisdiction is remarkable in
Congress' efforts to strip the Court
away from its history of judicial
itself. That the Court then broke
to rule against the presideference to security claims in wartime
that the decisions of the
dent, not even pausing at the argument
the courts," suggests just how
commander in chief are "binding on
uniwas by the President's assertion of
troubled the Court's majority
33 0
lateral executive power.
that the Court decline jurisdicIn other words, precedent demanded
decision to try Hamdan by
tion (or at least defer to the President's
were so "troubled" that they
military commission), but five Justices
by
The legal consideration identified
ignored this law to whack Bush.
so
of congressional authorization-is
the majority as central-lack
Once
inquiry into their real motives.
unconvincing as to invite an
pragmatic
engaged in a discretionary,
again, the Justices seem to have
weighing of three factors.
crisis. Justice Stevens and his colThe first was the severity of the
as an isolated event with no recurleagues apparently viewed 9/11
unlike an ongoing and nationrence for five years, and hence
War 11.331 These Justices obviously
menacing conflict such as World
in the future wage such an all-out
were aware that the terrorists might
the Court should insist on ordinary
war, but believed that until then
like
By contrast, dissenting Justices
procedures (like courts-martial).
as a pressing, continuous, and mortal
Thomas characterized terrorism
to
it prudent to allow the President
threat. Consequently, they found
access
discretion to deny Hamdan
create a military commission with
(noting Cole's
also Pilon, supra note 323, at v, xii
330 See Cole, supra note 9; see
Professor
legal weaknesses). On this score,
praise of Hamdan, despite its conceded
had
Court
the
that
John Yoo, who charged
a
Cole agreed with Bush's chief defender,
and
standing,
long
of
history, judicial decisions
"tossed aside centuries of American
Yoo,
John
trials."
military
the
interfere with
December 2005 law ordering them not to
System,
Formality of Nation's CriminalJustice
for
War
Mistakes
Ruling
Five Wrong Justices:
USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at 22A.
the legal
note 8, at 280-81 (pointing out that
331 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra
entire
the
mobilizing
World War Il-a total war
elite approved military tribunals in
as a
see
they
which
not in the War on Terrorism,
nation in a fight for its survival-but
life).
daily
in
sacrifices
or
few changes
comparatively low-stakes conflict involving

1076

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:3

to information that he could pass on to al Qaeda operatives, possibly
enabling them to harm and kill Americans.
Second, the members of the Court had radically different perspectives on the egregiousness of the legal violation. Formally, the
majority in Hamdan held only that the President lacked legislative permission to establish military tribunals. That statutory interpretation,
however, reflected fundamental concerns of due process -- ensuring
that the structure and procedures of military courts instill confidence
that trials will be fair and impartial. The majority saw the military
commissions as kangaroo courts with the discretion to bar the accused
from the trial, deny his access to relevant information, and admit
unreliable evidence-all subject to the executive branch's power to
alter the procedural rules at any time or to terminate the proceedings. 33 2 The dissenters, on the other hand, perceived no legal prob-

lem with trying alien enemy combatants by military commission rather
than court-martial. Indeed, such a commission struck them as espe33
cially appropriate for Hamdan, a trusted aide of Osama bin Laden.
Justice Thomas thought Hamdan was lucky to have been given the
usual criminal procedural rights, except for access to information that
might threaten national security.
Third, the Court did not mention, but surely knew, that President
Bush would obey its judgment. Despite his tough stance in prosecuting the War on Terrorism, he had never so much as hinted that he
would defy a judicial order. Even if Bush were so inclined, he did not
have the political strength to do so. At the time Hamdan came down,
Bush's popularity rating had sunk to historic lows, and he had little
political capital to waste. 33 4 Moreover, the Court wisely did not put
Bush's back up against a wall by declaring military commissions
unconstitutional. Rather, the majority signaled that such tribunals
would pass muster if Congress explicitly approved them. Returning
the courtesy, President Bush responded that he took the Court's rul332 See Katyal, supra note 9, at 74-75, 87-91, 99-105 (arguing that the Court's
statutory construction incorporated constitutional considerations raised by the President's assertion of unilateral and legally unlimited power to establish military commissions, promulgate questionable rules of procedure and evidence, and change such
rules at his whim).
333 It is important to bear in mind that Hamdan is an admitted al Qaeda insider,
not someone languishing in Guantanamo Bay because he had been swept up in an
overzealous post-September 11 raid. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and
Allied Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4,
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-194), 2006 WL 467688 (citing February 9, 2004
Affidavit of Salin Ahmed Hamdan, at 1-2).
334 Bush's approval rating had hit an all-time nadir of thirty-one percent the
month before the Court decided Hamdan. See supra note 280.
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ing "very seriously" and would work with Congress to enact a law on
-5
military commissions that would satisfy the majority's concerns.
Bush thereupon did exactly as promised, and Congress swiftly authorized such tribunals with very broad powers.3 3 6
As with the 2004 detention decisions, then, Hamdan is a setback
for the President, but hardly the devastating blow imagined by many
commentators.3 37 The Court has not plunged into a brave new world
of bold judicial review. Rather, fourJustices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito) embraced strong executive power; two others (Kennedy
and Breyer) concurred to emphasize the limited nature of the Court's
holding; and even Justice Stevens and his allies did not question the
President's authority to detain alien enemy combatants like Hamdan
or to try them outside of the ordinary federal court system. Rather,
the majority seized an opportunity to check a politically vulnerable
President by requiring him to obtain unmistakable authorization from
Congress before using military commissions in a nonemergency situa335 See Savage, supra note 9.
336 Military Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17,
2006). The quick passage of the MCA casts doubt on the Hamdan Court's suggestion
that the President had disregarded Congress's will in establishing military commissions. Indeed, the MCA rejects Hamdan in three important ways. First, the majority's
conclusion that the UCMJ required the executive to demonstrate in litigation the
impracticability of applying court-martial rules has been repudiated in section
949a(a) of the MCA, which grants the Secretary of Defense discretion to employ such
rules "so far as [he] considers practicable or consistent with military or intelligence
activities." Second, Congress disavowed the Court's expansive interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions by declaring that (1) the military commissions were "regularly
constituted courts" that met the requirements of Common Article 3, and (2) alien
unlawful enemy combatants could not invoke the Conventions as a source of legal
rights. See MCA §§ 948b (f)-(g); 28 U.S.C. § 2241, note § 5(a). Third, Congress
disapproved Hamdan and Rasul by eliminating federal court jurisdiction to consider
habeas petitions and other actions filed by alien enemy combatants. See MCA
§ 950j(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note § 7(a). Rather, the statute authorizes review exclusively by various military tribunals, followed by appeals to the D.C. Circuit and the
Supreme Court. See MCA § 950b-g. Congress did, however, address one of the
Court's major concerns by guaranteeing the accused's right to be present at all
proceedings as long as he does not engage in disruptive or dangerous conduct. See
MCA §§ 949a(b)(1)(B), 949d(b), (e).
337 SeeYoo, supra note 14, at 109; see also supra notes 9-10 (setting forth the views
of numerous scholars). Unlike in Hamdi, the majority and concurring opinions in
Hamdan did not mention the traditional deference shown to the executive branch's
military judgments. Professor Flaherty interprets this silence as signaling increased
judicial skepticism towards presidential claims of national security. See Flaherty, supra
note 9, at 74-76. Although that trend is possible, I doubt that the Court has suddenly
abandoned its historical posture of deference. Rather, it is flexing its muscles against
President Bush because it can.
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tion where regular procedures could be followed. The Court conspicuously avoided grand constitutional pronouncements and focused on
the particular circumstances.
The situation, and hence the Court's approach, could change in
an instant. For example, if the terrorists had succeeded in their July
2006 plot to blow up ten planes bound from England to the United
States, 338 Americans would have clamored for much tighter security
measures and harsh treatment of the perpetrators. In such a climate,
the Justices would become more reluctant to guarantee procedural
niceties to accused terrorists.
Overall, the four "enemy combatant" decisions follow a historical
pattern in which the Court has curbed the President and vindicated
individual rights when politically feasible to do so. Such cases
represent a statistical minority, however, as the Justices usually defer
to the military judgments of the majoritarian branches, often because
they have no other realistic choice. If the terrorists escalate their
attacks and the President responds aggressively, history suggests that
the Court will back down.
IV.

DEFENDING THE COURT'S DEFERENTIAL APPROACH

Many scholars have criticized the Court for failing to apply the
same level of review in disputes involving war powers as it does in
domestic cases-i.e., following its independent interpretation of the
Constitution, despite the contrary views of elected officials and possible negative political consequences.3 3 9 This argument gives short
shrift to basic elements of the Constitution's design which have always
338

Alan Cowell & Dexter Filkins, Terror Plot Foiled; Airports Quickly Clamp Down,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at Al.

339 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. On the domestic front, the Rehnquist Court did not hesitate to strike down federal statutes that, in its judgment,
exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-27 (2000)
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, which had been passed under both of
these powers); see also Grant S. Nelson & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But Preserve State

Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 132-36 (1999) (discussing Morrison).
Similarly, the Court followed its interpretation of the First Amendment in striking
down hugely popular federal and state laws banning flag burning. See United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20
(1989). Finally, the Court even resolved the 2000 presidential election deadlock,
based on a creative reading of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 104-10 (2000); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The PresidentialElection Dispute, the
Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and
Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 619-23 (2001) (discussing this issue).
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generated special (and very deferential) standards for reviewing the
exercise of military powers.
As the Founders recognized, war raises issues of utmost national
importance which Congress and the President can and will address,
340
and they will be held politically accountable for their decisions.
Subjecting such delicate policy judgments to exacting scrutiny by
unelected judges with no expertise in military affairs seems inappropriate in a constitutional democracy. 34 t Furthermore, the political
departments, especially the executive, have overwhelming instituI do not mean to imply, however, that in domestic cases the Court is heedless of
political consequences. Although such considerations are rarely mentioned in opinions, there are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 868-78 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, despite doubts about its correctness as an original
matter, in part because doing so might create the impression that the Court was yielding to political and social pressure). Another familiar example is the continuing
application of the political question doctrine to certain domestic disputes, such as
impeachment. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-38 (1993).
340 See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
341 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 83-84 (stressing that the Court's traditional deference to the political branches in military and foreign affairs reflects the constitutional
plan). This proposition seems unassailable as to decisions that affect all Americans
equally, such as declaring war and rationing goods that are vital to the war effort.
However, political checks have proved unreliable when a fearful majority overreacted
to a crisis and supported the political branches' suppression of the constitutional
rights and liberties of vulnerable and powerless minority groups (e.g., Japanese-Americans during World War II) and unpopular individuals (e.g., left-wing antiwar protestors during World War I and the Cold War). See Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at
2565-71, 2575, 2590-95. In such situations, the only possible forum for relief has
been an independent Article III court charged with the duty to hear complaints that
the government's actions ran afoul of the Constitution. Id. at 2590-95. Even though
federal courts have often performed this job poorly, they have sometimes acted courageously and have often set forth legal principles that constrain the government from
excessive measures in later emergencies. Id. at 2565-68, 2587-95.
The foregoing arguments explain why federal judges have always entertained
claims that military decisions have violated individual rights, albeit under very forgiving standards and with an awareness of political realities. I believe that such lenient
judicial review is appropriate, and I would not endorse complete judicial abdication
except in very rare and limited circumstances. See infra notes 351-57 and accompanying text.
Professors Posner and Vermeule reject the assertion that fear and panic have
caused government officials to exaggerate military risks and to adopt bad policies that
have unreasonably restricted civil liberties, thereby justifying more searching judicial
review. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 609-11, 626. Rather, they contend that
fear can motivate clear and decisive action that better protects national security while
still preserving individual rights and liberties at an optimal level. Id. at 609-11,
626-42.
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3 42 Congress's powers to declare war,
tional advantages in this area.
executive actions are designed to
fund the armed forces, and oversee
43
The President
for military efforts.
ensure broad-based support
and can implement war strategy
alone can respond to emergencies
and access to information
with the requisite swiftness, decisiveness, judiciary inherently prothe
(which is often secret) .544 By contrast,
than either Congress or the
ceeds far more slowly and deliberatively
nothing until a party files suit. Even
President. Indeed, courts can do
trials that (absent a settlethen, judges must conduct time-consuming that applies the law to the
ment) culminate in a reasoned judgment
that consider the legal issues still
pertinent facts, followed by appeals
typically elapse between the execfurther. 345 Therefore, several years
decision. This passage of time
utive's action and the Supreme Court's
constitutional law issues far more
often enables the Justices to evaluate
possible in the heat of the milidispassionately than would have been
the Presi3 46 Even then, however, courts can fairly judge
tary crisis.
he understood them at the moment
dent only based upon the facts as of hindsight. 347
benefit
of decision, not with the
insufficient because a
Finally, the judicial time lag is sometimes
the President has charted an irrevonation-threatening war drags on,
with
defy any order requiring him to comply
cable course, and he will
ajudgrendering
3 48 In such critical situations,
the Court's legal views.
effect will be to compromise the
ment seems pointless, for its only

at 975-99.
342 See Nzelibe, supra note 64,
text.
accompanying
and
343 See supra notes 45-52
see also Cole, Judging, supra note
text;
accompanying
and
344 See supra notes 53-60
branch's
feel ill-equipped to assess the executive
8, at 2570 (recognizing that judges
information).
it has a monopoly on the relevant
claims of national security because
Pusbaw,
attributes of judicial power, see
789,
345 For discussion of the essential
746,
at
38,
note
supra
Pushaw, Inherent,
that
Justiciability, supra note 38, at 415-27;
(maintaining
590-600
at
242,
Yoo, supra note
805-06, 809, 827, 844-46; see also
national
about
a poor position to make judgments
federal courts are institutionally in
rather
their focus on specific facts and issues
security because of their slow processes,
affairs).
foreign
and
military
lack of expertise in
than general policies, and their
accomthis reality. See supranote 122 and
acknowledges
sometimes
346 The Court
(providing
supra note 8, at 2566, 2575-76
panying text; see also Cole, judging,
examples).
political offiat 282-92, 300, 307 (arguing that
347 See Tushnet, supra note 185,
is unceroutcome
war's
the
when
make decisions
of a
cials, especially the President, must
because
or inaccurate (sometimes
tain and information is often incomplete
decisions,
such
of
biases), whereas later critics
subordinate official's mistakes or
12, at 863-70
of hindsight); Maltz, supra note
advantage
including courts, have the
(to similar effect).
and
the interaction between the President
348 See supraPart I1.B.1, II.C (discussing
World War II).
the Court during the Civil War and
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Court's legitimacy. For instance, Chief Justice Taney's unheeded
order to Lincoln to release a military prisoner ended up highlighting
the Court's own impotence. 3 49 It is worth remembering that today we
revere Lincoln and revile Taney. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice
showed real courage in confronting Lincoln throughout the Civil
War, as did Justice Jackson in standing up to his patron Franklin
Roosevelt during World War II in Korematsu. Such genuine acts of
judicial valor should not be cheapened by comparing them with the
Court's exploitation of politically weak and unpopular Presidents like
Andrew Johnson, Harry Truman, and George W. Bush.
In short, the Court has generally, and appropriately, recognized
that separation of powers dictates great respect for the military decisions of Congress and the President. Moreover, the Justices have inevitably decided cases based not simply upon abstract rules of law, but
also upon various political and practical considerations. Operating
within these constitutional and pragmatic confines, the Court has
tried to articulate and enforce individual rights and liberties to the
extent possible, as it did recently in the "enemy combatant" litigation.
On the whole, I think the Court has performed about as well as can be
3 50
expected, even though I disagree with many of its rulings.
The only cases where I would change the approach (albeit not
the result) are those in which a politically powerful President, such as
Lincoln or Roosevelt, has made a decision to violate a particular constitutional provision because he concludes that such a drastic measure
is necessary to win a war that imperils America's very existence, and
therefore will likely disobey any judicial order to halt the policy. In
such unique circumstances, the Court should not uphold the President's actions on the merits. Rather, it should avoid decision altogether by denying certiorari,3 5 1 declaring the question presented to

349 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text; see also Cole, Judging, supra note
8, at 2570-71 (acknowledging that such defiance, when the President has concluded
that national security is at stake, weakens the Court's credibility).
350 For example, I believe that Rasul and Hamdan rest on incorrect statutory interpretations that disregard precedent squarely on point, and that these cases might
impede our efforts to combat worldwide terrorism. So far, however, they have not
had any catastrophic effects. See Katyal, supra note 9, at 104 (observing that the Bush
Administration's dire warnings that adverse decisions in Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan
would threaten national security have not materialized).
351 Since 1988, the Court has had complete discretion in deciding whether or not
to grant such a writ. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000). Hence, denying review raises no
legal problems.
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be "political," 35 2 or delaying judgment through resort to doctrines
3

such as ripeness.

53

Admittedly, the selective invocation of judicial restraint concepts
can be decried as unprincipled, even cowardly.3 54 Nonetheless, what
actually happened in cases like Korematsu was even more legally and
morally indefensible: sustaining blatantly unconstitutional conduct,
which gave the President the invaluable stamp of approval by the
Supreme Court, our most respected and prestigious government institution.3 5

5

Instead, the Justices should have forced Congress and the

President to accept total responsibility for their actions, to be judged
by voters and posterity.3 5 6
352 See Pushaw, supra note 43 (examining the political question doctrine). I would
confine my proposal to this unusual situation. Other scholars have contended more
broadly that courts should frankly recognize that executive officials will exercise extraconstitutional powers during emergencies and should leave judgment on such actions
to the political process, instead of rationalizing such measures as constitutionally valid
and thereby contaminating constitutional law. See, e.g.,
Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules:
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1121-26
(2003); Tushnet, supra note 185, at 298-307.
353 See MAY, supra note 37, at 272-73 (deeming ripeness especially useful because
it allows a court to consider its capacity to adjudicate a case properly in light of the
nature of the emergency, its relationship to the challenged measure, the state of the
factual record, and the type of relief sought).
354 The classic defense of such jurisdictional manipulation, for the purpose of
ensuring that constitutional decisions on the merits are always principled, is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d. ed. 1986) (1962).
1 do not
believe, however, that Bickel's approach should be applied outside the context of an
implacable President engaged in a cataclysmic war. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra
note 38, at 465-67 (criticizing Bickel's argument).
355 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Tushnet, supra note 185, at 301 (citing CHtARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT 47-86 (1960)) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court legitimizes government actions taken in an emergency by upholding their constitutionality); see also
MAY, supra note 37, at 260-68 (arguing that the political question doctrine amounts
to an abdication of duty, but is still preferable to the Korematsu approach of approving
a measure that risks permanent damage to the Constitution).
356 Some scholars have countered that principled judicial review is necessary to
facilitate meaningful congressional involvement, See, e.g., ELY, supra note 11, at
47-67. Concededly, many constitutional provisions require Congress to take affirmative steps to authorize executive action during wartime. Most pertinent here is the
prohibition on suspending habeas corpus absent express congressional approval in
times of invasion or rebellion. This clause indicates that the President cannot detain
citizens during wartime without such legislation (or a criminal indictment).

See

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), discussed
supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. But see Tushnet, supra note 185, at
301-03 (contending that it is futile to expect a Constitution's designers to be able to

formulate a provision, such as the Nonsuspension Clause, that will always constrain
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With this single exception, I believe the Court's approach is
defensible on both constitutional and pragmatic grounds. Indeed, it
is wishful thinking to expect that the Court can, or will, apply robust
judicial review to political branch actions during wartime.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our Founding Fathers wisely committed the formulation and
execution of military policy to Congress and the President. When
political decisions about war allegedly invade individual constitutional
rights, the Supreme Court has either declined to intervene or has
applied a deferential standard of review whereby the government's
actions are usually (but not always) upheld. Admittedly, war powers
jurisprudence is not a model of legal consistency. Nor can it be, for
the Court has properly paid close attention to the facts and context of
each case -and to its own institutional and political limits during
wartime.
Accordingly, it would be a mistake to interpret the recent cases
upholding the rights of enemy combatants as portending a more general shift towards greater protection of individual liberty in the military context. History has taught us that such decisions are the
exception, not the rule. During wartime, judicial discretion is usually
the better part of valor.

future exercises of power in response to emergencies that they could never have foreseen, such as the attack on the World Trade Center); Ackerman, supra note 185, at
1038, 1053, 1084-87 (to similar effect). Likewise, Article I restricts any appropriations
for military support to a two-year maximum and allows Congress to decline to provide
such funding or to halt a prior appropriation. See supranotes 48-49, 61 and accompanying text. Historically, judicial nonenforcement of such constitutional provisions
has resulted in the President asserting discretion to act and Congress doing nothing
to stop him, thereby effectuating a vast accumulation of power in the executive.
The short response is that the Constitution allocates war powers to the political
branches, not the judiciary. See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 299-300. Congress's failure to exercise its ample Article I powers to check the President (e.g., by
denying military funding) does not somehow authorize federal courts to step in to
encourage Congress to act. Id.
Although federal judges cannot referee disputes between Congress and the President over war powers, they can enforce constitutional provisions (e.g., the Nonsuspension Clause) at the behest of an individual who alleges unlawful federal
government conduct that affects her. Whether such review proves successful depends
primarily on the circumstances of the case.
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